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Abusive Constitutionalism
David Landau*
This paper identifies an increasingly important phenomenon: the use of
mechanisms of constitutional change to erode the democratic order. A rash
of recent incidents in a diverse group of countries such as Hungary, Egypt,
and Venezuela has shown that the tools of constitutional amendment and
replacement can be used by would-be autocrats to undermine democracy
with relative ease. Since military coups and other blatant ruptures in the
constitutional order have fallen out of favor, actors instead rework the
constitutional order with subtle changes in order to make themselves
difficult to dislodge and to disable or pack courts and other accountability
institutions. The resulting regimes continue to have elections and are not
fully authoritarian, but they are significantly less democratic than they
were previously. Even worse, the problem of abusive constitutionalism
remains largely unresolved, since democratic defense mechanisms in both
comparative constitutional law and international law are largely
ineffective against it. Some of the mechanisms most relied upon in the
literature — such as the German conception of militant democracy and
the unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine — are in fact
either difficult to deploy against the threat of abusive constitutionalism or
easily avoidable by would-be authoritarian actors. This Article suggests
ways to reinforce democracy against these threats, while acknowledging
the extreme difficulty of the task. The phenomenon of abusive
constitutionalism should impact the conversation about how the fields of
*
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comparative constitutional law and international law might best be
leveraged to protect new democracies.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the central questions in constitutional theory is how
constitutions can be used to better protect against threats to the
democratic order. This question has taken on new urgency since the
Arab Spring, with a fresh wave of new, embattled democracies
throughout the Middle East. This Article defines and grapples with an
increasingly important phenomenon that I call abusive
constitutionalism. Abusive constitutionalism involves the use of the
mechanisms of constitutional change — constitutional amendment
and constitutional replacement — to undermine democracy. While
traditional methods of democratic overthrow such as the military coup
have been on the decline for decades, the use of constitutional tools to
create authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes is increasingly
prevalent. Powerful incumbent presidents and parties can engineer
constitutional change so as to make themselves very difficult to
dislodge and so as to defuse institutions such as courts that are
intended to check their exercises as power. The resulting constitutions
still look democratic from a distance and contain many elements that
are no different from those found in liberal democratic constitutions.
But from close up they have been substantially reworked to undermine
the democratic order.
I draw off of recent examples from Hungary, Colombia, and
Venezuela to illustrate the threat. But it is important to note that these
examples only scratch the surface of what is an increasingly routine
occurrence. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt recently
used its dominating electoral power in the parliament, constituent
assembly, and presidency, rather than extra-legal means, to craft a
constitution that appears to be very favorable to its own interests.1
Although the civilian government was since removed in a coup,
commentators have argued that the constitution-making experience
was designed to construct Egypt as a competitive authoritarian regime,
where elections are held but the incumbent party is difficult to
dislodge and relatively unchecked in its power.2
1
See David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV. 923, 97180 (2013) [hereinafter Constitution-Making] (summarizing and analyzing the Egyptian
constitution-making process).
2
See, e.g., Abdullah Al-Arian, The Logic Behind Egypt’s New Authoritarianism, AL
JAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/12/2012124111437225259.html
(last modified Dec. 5, 2012, 9:48 AM) (examining the constitution-making process in
Egypt and arguing that it may lead to a “new authoritarianism” there); Zachary Laub,
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/africa/egyptsmuslim-brotherhood/p23991?cid=rss-middleeast-egypt_s_muslim_brotherhood-120312
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Similarly, the phenomenon is showing up even in some countries
generally considered stable liberal democracies. For example, the
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the leader of the traditionally
dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), recently announced that he
would pursue constitutional changes that would reduce the required
majorities for constitutional change from two thirds of the Diet to only
a simple majority.3 Since the LDP won massive legislative majorities in
the last election, it will likely be able to push through this proposal.
There is little risk that such a change will render Japan thoroughly
undemocratic, but it does serve to erode democracy by allowing the
powerful LDP to unilaterally push through any changes it might want.
Such changes could obviously be used to increase the power of the
LDP and to reduce the already-weak checks (such as the judiciary) on
its power.4
Constitutions have proven to be remarkably susceptible to these
sorts of maneuvers. In countries outside of the United States,
amendment thresholds are often set fairly low, allowing incumbents to
round up sufficient support for sweeping changes with relative ease.
Even where amendment thresholds are set higher, incumbent regimes
can reach requisite legislative supermajorities with surprising
frequency. And where constitutions cannot be amended in ways that
would-be autocrats would like, these figures can often replace
constitutional texts quite easily, as recently occurred in Hungary,
Ecuador, and Venezuela. The set of formal rules found in constitutions
is proving to be a mere parchment barrier against authoritarian and
quasi-authoritarian regimes.
There is even worse news: existing democracy-protecting
mechanisms in international and comparative constitutional law have
(last updated July 10, 2013) (noting the Muslim Brotherhood’s reliance on
“majoritarianism” and the broad powers accorded to the president under the new
constitution).
3
Lawrence Repeta, Get Ready for New Battles Over Japan’s Constitution, INT’L J.
CONST. L. BLOG (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2013/02/get-ready-fornew-battles-over-japans-constitution.
4
Scholars have long noted that the Japanese Supreme Court is a weak institution
that does not carry out effective judicial review. The stock reason proceeds from the
absence of political competition in the country — the dominant LDP party has had no
reason to empower a court that would only check its power. See, e.g., David S. Law,
Why Has Judicial Review Failed in Japan?, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1425, 1426-28 (2011)
(accepting parts of this story while arguing that it is oversimplified); J. Mark
Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 721, 722 (1994) (comparing the United States and Japanese Supreme Courts,
and arguing that the lack of independence of the latter can be attributed to an absence
of political competition).
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proven ineffective against this new threat. Abusive constitutionalism is
much harder to detect than traditional authoritarian threats. In
international law, so-called “democracy clauses” often punish regimes
that come to power through unconstitutional means. These clauses are
effective at detecting traditional military coups, which are openly
unconstitutional, but much less effective at detecting abusive
constitutionalism, which uses means that are either constitutional or
ambiguously constitutional. The recent experience in Honduras, for
example, shows how these clauses fail to effectively combat abusive
constitutionalism.5 In comparative constitutional law, the most
important democracy-protecting mechanism, recently touted by
Samuel Issacharoff, is the “militant democracy” conception created in
post-war Germany, which allows for bans on anti-democratic parties
(such as the Nazi party) before they have the chance to grow and gain
power within the democratic order.6 This conception is again useful
for staving off traditional authoritarian threats carried by obviously
anti-democratic forces like the Nazis, but much less useful for
contending with the more ambiguous, non-ideological threat posed by
abusive constitutionalism. Abusive constitutionalism thus poses
problems that are not being effectively combatted in either
international law or domestic constitutional law.
A more promising set of responses focuses on the design of
mechanisms of constitutional change, particularly constitutional
amendment rules. This model, which one might call “selective
rigidity,” combines a low threshold for most amendments with
selected blockage or higher thresholds for some kinds of change that
are particularly likely to lead to abusive constitutionalism. For
example, constitutional designers can use tiered constitutional
provisions to make it more difficult to change sensitive structural
provisions that are especially likely to be targeted by abusive
constitutional efforts. Courts can also be given the power to strike
down some proposed amendments that violate core principles of the
constitutional order — this is the so-called “unconstitutionalconstitutional amendments doctrine,” which has been used to great

5
See generally Noah Feldman, David Landau, Brian Sheppard & Leonidas RosaSuazo, Report to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Honduras: Constitutional
Issues (Fla. St. U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 536, 2011), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1915214 (examining both the
abusive constitutionalism of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya and the questionable
constitutionality of his removal from power).
6
See Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1408-09
(2007) [hereinafter Democracies].
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effect by courts in India, Turkey, and Colombia. These kinds of
responses represent a state-of-the-art in constitutional theory.
But scholars appear to have overstated the ability of these tools to
prevent abusive constitutionalism. They may help stop some exercises,
but they also contain weaknesses that limit their ability to serve as
defense mechanisms for democracy. Tiered constitutional provisions,
as currently designed, tend to serve an expressive function more than
a practical one — the heightened amendment thresholds tend to
protect provisions like human dignity, which are unlikely to be
targeted by abusive constitutional regimes. And it is doubtful that
constitutional designers could adequately write tiered provisions in a
way that would protect all of the vulnerable elements of constitutional
structure, at least without making the text unduly rigid. The
unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine can be deployed
more flexibly, but this very flexibility can be problematic — in some
cases, the doctrine appears to be interpreted far too broadly in order to
cut off ordinary democratic politics, while in other cases courts are
packed or threatened in ways that make the doctrine impossible to
deploy. Further, the doctrine rests on a distinction between
constitutional amendment (which is seen as susceptible to abuse) and
constitutional replacement (which is seen as representing the
authentic will of the people) that is belied by reality. Constitutional
replacement, as well as amendment, can be and is used by would-be
authoritarians to advance their agendas.
The rest of this Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I define
abusive constitutionalism, give recent examples of it in Colombia,
Venezuela, and Hungary, and explain why constitutional tools are so
effective at entrenching modern authoritarian regimes. Constitutional
change allows authoritarian actors to remove members of the political
opposition and to replace them with officials loyal to the incumbents;
to weaken, disable, or pack courts as well as other mechanisms of
accountability; and to establish government control over the media
and other key institutions. Part II explains why existing tools in
comparative constitutional law — the militant democracy conception
made famous by German constitutionalism, tiered constitutional
amendment thresholds, and the unconstitutional-constitutional
amendments doctrine — appear to fail when confronted with abusive
constitutionalism. Part III points out similar holes in democracyprotection mechanisms in international law, and considers the
prospects of emerging solutions like the recent call for an
International Constitutional Court. Finally, I conclude by asking
whether constitutional theory is capable of devising better solutions to
the problem I have identified. The study of abusive constitutionalism
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forms a research agenda that ought to command more attention from
constitutional designers, and that may help inform key questions in
constitutional theory — such as the nature of constitutionalism and
the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy.
I.

DEFINING AND EXPLAINING ABUSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM

In this Part, I define the practice of abusive constitutionalism and
situate it within recent advances in both constitutional theory and
regime theory, explaining why constitutionalism is now being used
quite frequently to weaken democracy. In contrast to past practice,
where authoritarian regimes were generally formed through military
coup or other unconstitutional practices, would-be autocrats now have
significant incentives to appear to be playing by the constitutional
rules.7 Thus they are increasingly turning towards constitutional
amendment and replacement as tools to help them construct a more
authoritarian order. Then I give three examples drawn from recent
experiences in Colombia, Venezuela, and Hungary, showing how
powerful individuals and political parties can use the tools of
constitutionalism to undermine it.8 The end result of these practices is
not likely to be full-fledged authoritarianism, but rather a hybrid
regime where elections continue to be held but opposition forces face
severe disadvantages in seeking to win election. Finally, I synthesize
the results of the case studies to explain why constitutionalism
appears to be important to these various efforts.9
A. Defining and Situating Abusive Constitutionalism
I define “abusive constitutionalism” as the use of mechanisms of
constitutional change in order to make a state significantly less
democratic than it was before. In referring to the mechanisms of
constitutional change, I focus here on formal rather than informal
methods of change — constitutional amendment and constitutional
replacement. In referring to maneuvers that make a regime
“significantly less democratic,” I conceptualize democracy on a
spectrum, acknowledging that there are various kinds of hybrid or
competitive authoritarian regimes between full authoritarianism and
full democracy.10 Finally, in referring to the degree of democracy in a

7
8
9
10

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Parts I.B–D.
See infra Part I.E.
See infra text accompanying notes 24–29.
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given country, I focus on two distinct dimensions: (1) the electoral
sphere and the extent to which incumbent and opposition figures
compete on a level playing field, and (2) the extent to which the rights
of individuals and minority groups are protected.11 Conceptually,
these two dimensions are independent and could diverge, but in the
regimes discussed here, backsliding in the electoral realm appears to
be highly correlated with backsliding on rights questions.
The biggest fear for those promoting democracy in the developing
world has long been the military coup. In Latin America, alone, all but
two major countries were under military dictatorship at some point in
the 1960s and 1970s.12 Although in some cases military dictators
might seek legal legitimation for their actions, military coups are
ordinarily done in obvious defiance of the existing constitutional
order.13 In Chile, for example, the military removed the civilian regime
11
The rights dimension is sometimes classified as the degree to which a regime is
liberal, which is sometimes placed in opposition to democracy and at other times seen
as “constitutive” of it. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE
THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 8 (1995). Given broad practical agreement on the
desirability of rights protections within a state, I do not enter into that debate here. To
be sure, these two dimensions may not exhaust the normative dimensions of
democracy. We might, for example, define democracy with respect to participation as
well, and some analysts of at least the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian regimes below have
made claims that they represent a significant advance in the quality and extent of
participation within those countries. See, e.g., Maxwell Cameron & Kenneth E.
Sharpe, Andean Left Turns: Constituent Power and Constitution Making, in LATIN
AMERICA’S LEFT TURNS: POLITICS, POLICIES, AND TRAJECTORIES OF CHANGE 61, 68
(Maxwell A. Cameron & Eric Hershberg eds., 2010) (analyzing the community
councils and recall referenda within the Venezuelan constitution, and contextualizing
it within the “mobilization function” of Chavez’s project). There is no doubt that the
Constitutions contain novel clauses, such as presidential recall provisions and
provisions including civil society groups in judicial selection, that might be very
useful as the basis for a more participatory democratic order. Whether in fact these
provisions functioned to create a more participatory order is more contestable. See,
e.g., ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE CHÁVEZ
AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT 227-30 (2010) (noting that the provisions allowing civil
society groups to participate in the selection of Supreme Court justices were not
implemented).
12
See, e.g., Guillermo O’Donnell, Introduction to the Latin American Cases, in
TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA 3, 5 (Guillermo O’Donnell et
al. eds., 1986) (noting Venezuela and Colombia as exceptions).
13
Even in the classic form of military dictatorship, autocracy and
constitutionalism are not as opposed as is often thought. Constitutionalism may be
valuable for authoritarian regimes in helping to organize and formalize power,
increase legitimacy, control subordinate officials, and attract foreign investment. See
TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN EGYPT 13-15 (2007) (showing how the Egyptian
Constitutional Court was given considerable interpretative power over the
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in 1973 by bombing and storming the presidential palace, closing the
Congress, and suspending most parts of the existing constitution.14
The country lived under no real constitutional order until 1980, when
the military regime adopted a new text.15
However, the number of coups has fallen sharply since their heyday
in the 1960s.16 The end of the Cold War reduced the tolerance of
powerful states for obviously non-democratic regimes, and it also
shifted cultural norms at the international level towards recognition of
the importance of democracy.17 Military involvement has become
particularly disfavored, especially in regions such as Latin America
with a long history of such involvement. Moreover, as noted in more
detail in Part III, many regions have adopted so-called “democracy
clauses,” punishing states that overthrow democratic regimes in
flagrant violation of constitutional norms.18 This has pushed would-be
autocrats towards more constitutional methods of change. Further,
many of the coups that have happened recently have been less clearly
anti-democratic than traditional military takeovers. Recent empirical
research has shown that while Cold War era coups tended to end in
long-running military dictatorships, more recent coups have tended to
lead to rapid restorations of civilian rule.19 And as Ozan Varol has
constitution in order to attract foreign investment and to control interpretations of
Islamic provisions); Tamir Moustafa & Tom Ginsburg, Introduction: The Functions of
Courts in Authoritarian Politics, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 1, 4-11 (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) (laying
out the reasons why authoritarian actors might establish judicial review and
independent courts).
14
See Manuel Antonio Garretón, The Political Evolution of the Chilean Military
Regime and Problems in the Transition to Democracy, in TRANSITIONS FROM
AUTHORITARIAN RULE: LATIN AMERICA, supra note 12, at 95-98.
15
See id. at 109-10.
16
See, e.g., Jonathan M. Powell & Clayton L. Thyne, Global Instances of Coups
from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset, 48 J. PEACE RES. 249, 255 (2011), available at
http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/powell-thyne-JPR-2011.pdf (finding “a fairly clear
decline in the total frequency of coup attempts over time,” although noting that the
success rate has increased in the past ten years or so).
17
See, e.g., Susan Marks, What Has Become of the Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance?, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 507, 511-12 (2011).
18
See Stephen J. Schnably, Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in the
Inter-American System [hereinafter Constitutionalism], in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155, 166-68 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000)
(exploring the role of the democracy clause and electoral monitoring within the
Organization of American States); infra Part III.A.
19
See Nikolay Marinov & Heins Goemens, Coups and Democracy, 44 BRIT. J. POL.
SCI. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 24), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2270631.
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recently shown, some coups — such as the one ending military rule in
Egypt — even have pro-democratic effects.20 Thus the
unconstitutional coup, aside from being of declining significance, may
also be overstated as a danger in the modern world. It is, at any rate,
not the best basis for building modern constitutional design and
theory.
The alternative route of taking power constitutionally, and then
using that power to overthrow democracy, is itself not a new idea.
Indeed, perhaps the paradigm anti-canonical event around which
modern comparative constitutional law was built — the Nazi
overthrow of Weimar Germany — occurred using arguably
constitutional means.21 In a terrible economic and unstable political
environment, with a series of coalition governments falling in quick
succession, the Nazis moved from a fringe party to a major movement.
Hitler was appointed chancellor of a coalition government in 1933,
and then convinced both the President and the Reichstag, itself, to
give him the dictatorial powers he needed to create a totalitarian
state.22 This nightmare of constitutionalism being used to destroy
democracy informed much of post-war constitutional thought,
including the concept of “militant democracy” that is considered in
more detail in Part II.23
Nonetheless, there are major differences between the Nazi takeover
of Weimar Germany and the abusive constitutional tools considered in
this Article. Most importantly, the Nazis replaced the Weimar
Republic with a thoroughly authoritarian regime, thus using
constitutionalism to completely destroy democracy. The existence of
clearly authoritarian regimes has decreased through time, again largely
because of the changes in the international environment surveyed
above.24 Yet not of all these regimes have become fully democratic —
20
Ozan Varol, The Democratic Coup d’Etat, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 291, 294 (2012)
(exploring coups in Portugal, Turkey, and Egypt that had pro-democratic effects, and
noting that “some military coups are distinctly more democracy-promoting than
others”).
21
See generally DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: CARL SCHMITT, HANS
KELSEN AND HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR (1997) (noting that the Nazi takeover of the
Weimar Republic occurred using legal means).
22
See, e.g., David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 598
(2009) (describing how the Nazis used their power within the government to
“eliminate opposition and eventually repeal the entire Weimar constitution itself”);
Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its
Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1811 (2010) (noting the use of emergency powers by
the Nazis in the Weimar Constitution).
23
See infra Part II.A.
24
For example, data from Freedom House shows that those regimes classified as
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instead, many have become what political scientists call “competitive
authoritarian,” “electoral autocracies,” or simply “hybrid” regimes,
melding some aspects of democracy with some aspects of
authoritarianism.25
These regimes generally satisfy international actors in that they are
sufficiently democratic to avoid sanctions and other consequences —
elections are held, and they are not mere shams. There is enough
electoral competition for opposition forces to compete and
occasionally win.26 But at the same time, the deck is systematically
stacked against those trying to unseat incumbents through a variety of
means: government control of media, harassment of opposition
politicians and operatives, use of state patronage resources to secure
votes, and, in some cases, electoral fraud.27 As a result, incumbents
currently in power tend to stay in power, and mechanisms of vertical
accountability become distorted.

“not free” have dropped steadily from forty-six percent of all countries in 1972 to
twenty-four percent in 2012. During the same time period, the percentage of regimes
classified as “partly free” — a reasonable proxy for the “hybrid regimes” discussed in this
paper — has increased from twenty-five percent to thirty percent. See FREEDOM HOUSE,
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2013, at 24 (2013), available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/
sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Charts%20and%20Graphs%20for%20Web.pdf.
25
See, e.g., STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM:
HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 5 (2010) (“Competitive authoritarian regimes
are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely
viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’ abuse of the
state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents.”); Larry
Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at 21-22 (noting
that regimes like Russia, Venezuela, Turkey, and the Ukraine have elections, but yet
did not appear to be truly democratic); Andreas Schedler, The Logic of Electoral
Authoritarianism, in ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM: THE DYNAMICS OF UNFREE
COMPETITION 1, 3-5 (Andreas Schedler ed., 2006) (coining and explaining the concept
of “electoral authoritarianism”). There is also a related concept discussed by
Guillermo O’Donnell, “delegative democracy,” where leaders are subject to vertical
accountability via elections but not horizontal accountability via checks by courts or
legislatures. See Guillermo O’Donnell, Delegative Democracy, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 1994,
at 55-56. The “delegative democracy” concept, however, is different from the kind of
regimes discussed here because it at least assumes a fair shot to periodically oust
incumbents from office.
26
See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 25, at 12 (noting that incumbents in
competitive authoritarian regimes “fear a possible opposition victory” and must “work
hard to thwart it”).
27
See id. (noting that “unfair competition” is the key element of the “competitive
authoritarian” regime type, with opposition subject to “surveillance, harassment, and
occasional violence” and with electoral and judicial authorities generally deployed
against them rather than acting as neutral arbiters).
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Moreover, in these regimes the dominant political actors and forces
tend to control not only the branches of government, but also the
mechanisms of horizontal accountability that are supposed to check
political actors. Thus, institutions like courts, ombudsmen, attorney
general’s offices, and electoral commissions all tend to be controlled
by incumbents.28 Rather than serving as independent checks on
government power, these institutions are actively working on behalf of
their political projects. The result is not only to undermine electoral
competition, but also to sharply limit the extent of protection of rights
for minority groups within these systems. The core problem, then, is
that it is fairly easy to construct a regime that looks democratic, but in
actuality is not fully democratic, at least along two important
dimensions: vertical and horizontal checks on elected leaders and
rights protection for disempowered groups. A regime with these two
characteristics — a relative absence of accountability and a lack of
rights protection — is meaningfully less democratic than a regime
with higher levels of vertical and horizontal accountability and more
meaningful rights protection. Moreover, an absence of accountability
is plausibly associated with other ills, like increased levels of
corruption. In the examples below, I demonstrate how incumbent
regimes in three countries — Colombia, Venezuela, and Hungary —
have all attempted to use mechanisms of constitutional change to
move towards such a regime.29
B. Abusive Constitutionalism by Amendment: Colombia
Colombia has historically maintained a semblance of democracy,
largely by relying on regular elections and rotation in the presidency,
with only a small number of historical exceptions. The country, for
example, has had far fewer and shorter interludes of military
authoritarianism then its neighbors.30 Also, historically, presidents
have generally been limited to a single term in office, and this has

28

See id. at 27-28.
I am not claiming that manipulation of constitutional rules by powerful
incumbents is a new phenomenon. Latin American constitutions, for example, have a
long history of being manipulated for the gain of particular actors. See, e.g., Miguel
Schor, Constitutionalism Through the Looking Glass of Latin America, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J.
1, 4 (2006) (lamenting “[t]he ease with which constitutions can be changed or
ignored” in Latin America).
30
See DAVID BUSHNELL, THE MAKING OF MODERN COLOMBIA: A NATION IN SPITE OF
ITSELF 284-85 (1993).
29
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helped to maintain the democratic order by preventing the emergence
of strongmen with a continuous hold on the office.31
However, President Alvaro Uribe Velez tested this paradigm after
winning election in 2002. Like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, he won as
an outsider, running against the traditional two-party system.32 He
gained substantial popularity as a result of the perception that he was
responsible for a marked drop in violence in the country,33 and he
leveraged his popularity in order to push through an amendment to
the Constitution allowing him a second term in office.34 The
Colombian Constitution is fairly easy to amend, requiring only an
absolute majority of Congress in two consecutive sessions, and Uribe
was easily able to surpass this threshold.35
A group of citizens challenged the law in front of the Colombian
Constitutional Court, alleging that there were procedural irregularities
and that the amendment constituted a “substitution of the
Constitution” that could not be carried out by amendment, but instead
only by a Constituent Assembly.36 On the second point, they
emphasized that the design of the Constitution was set up for oneterm presidents, and that by holding more than one term Uribe would
31

See id. at 284.
See Kurt Weyland, Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: How Much
Affinity?, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 1095, 1111 (2003) (labeling Uribe a populist who won
election outside of the traditional political party system). As in Venezuela, the
country’s traditional party system had been losing legitimacy through time,
particularly since the enactment of a new Constitution in 1991. See Eduardo Pizarro
Leongómez, Giants with Feet of Clay: Political Parties in Colombia, in THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE ANDES 78, 78-79 (Scott Mainwaring et al. eds.,
2006).
33
See, e.g., Ann Mason, Colombia’s Democratic Security Agenda: Public Order in the
Security Tripod, 26 SEC. DIALOGUE 391, 396-98 (2003) (explaining Uribe’s “democratic
security” policy and its results in reducing guerrilla violence).
34
See Rodrigo Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin
America: Trends and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1598 & n.76 (2011).
35
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 375 (requiring a simple
majority of Congress in the first round and an absolute majority in the second round).
36
See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Octubre 19, 2005,
Sentencia C-1040/05, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2005/C-1040-05.htm. The substitution
of the constitution doctrine holds that certain amendments are substantively
unconstitutional because they effectively create a new constitution, rather than
amending the existing one. These changes must be done through Constituent
Assemblies and replacement of the constitution, rather than via amendment. See infra
Part III.B (discussing the doctrine). See generally Carlos Bernal-Pulido, Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia: An Analysis of the Justification
and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 339 (2013)
(examining relevant jurisprudence and developing a justification of the doctrine).
32
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be allowed to appoint many of the officers who were responsible for
checking him.37 They also noted that Uribe would face substantial
electoral advantages because of his office, and thus would be difficult
to dislodge. The Court responded that two-term presidencies were
fairly normal internationally, that the extra four years would not allow
him to capture all or most control institutions, and that special legal
safeguards taken during the re-election campaign would help to
ameliorate Uribe’s advantages.38 However, it also warned that the
allowance of additional terms — beyond two — may well be
unconstitutional, because the electoral advantages enjoyed by the
incumbent would grow, and horizontal checks on his power would
erode.39
The Court was forced to face this situation four years later, after
Uribe had won a second term. Supporters of the still-popular President
worked to pass an amendment allowing a third term through
Congress, and the Congress approved a referendum on whether three
consecutive terms in office should be allowed.40 If given to the public,
the referendum almost certainly would have passed, since Uribe
continued to enjoy approval ratings well above sixty percent.41 The
Constitutional Court was again faced with the problem of whether the
amendment was constitutional, both procedurally and substantively
— this time it struck it down on both grounds.42 Procedurally, the
Court found problems with the financing of the initiative and with its
passage through Congress. Substantively, it noted in detail the ways in
which Uribe’s re-election would allow him to influence the selection of
virtually all officials which were supposed to be checking him, and
37
Other institutions often have staggered terms so that no single president will be
able to appoint all of them. For example, the national ombudsman (Defensor del
Pueblo), General Prosecutor, and Public Ministry (Procuraduria) have four-year terms
that are not coterminous with that of the President. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE
COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 249, 281. Justices of the Council of State, Supreme Court, and
Constitutional Court have eight-year terms. See id. art. 233.
38
See C.C., Octubre 19, 2005, Sentencia C-1040/05, §§ 7.10.4.1–7.10.4.2, G.C.C.
(Colom.). The amendment included a requirement that Congress pass a statutory law
regulating the rights of the opposition, and in order to help ensure a level playing
field. See L. 2/04, diciembre 28, 2004, DIARIO OFFICIAL [D.O.] No. 45.775 (Colom.).
39
See C.C., Sentencia C-1040/05, §§ 7.10.4.1–7.10.4.2.
40
See L. 1354/09, septiembre 8, 2009, D.O. No. 47.466 (Colom.).
41
See Popularidad de Alvaro Uribe cae 6 puntos y se ubica en 64 por ciento, su nivel
mas bajo en 7 anos, EL TIEMPO (Colom.) (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.eltiempo.com/
archivo/documento/CMS-6527007http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS6527007.
42
See C.C., febrero 26, 2010, Sentencia C-141/10, pt. VI, G.C.C. (Colom.),
available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2010/c-141-10.htm.
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thus would have “deep repercussions on the institutional design
adopted by the Constituent Assembly.”43 Moreover, it noted that the
advantages of incumbency would potentially grow over time, making
Uribe increasingly difficult to dislodge from the presidency. In short,
the Court held that the second re-election constituted a “substitution
of the Constitution” because it would create such a strong presidency
as to weaken democratic institutions.44
The decision was complied with, and Uribe did not run for a third
term.45 It is probably too much to say that the Court succeeded in
preventing Colombia from becoming a competitive authoritarian
regime; unlike Hugo Chavez in Venezuela or Rafael Correa in
Ecuador, Uribe did not launch all-out attacks against most of the
horizontal checks on his power, or threaten to remake the entire
institutional order. Further, the Colombian regime contains a high
number of relatively autonomous checking institutions, and it would
not have been easy for Uribe to pack all of these institutions.46 But the
Court probably did prevent a significant erosion of democracy by
preventing a strong president from holding onto power indefinitely.
C. Abusive Constitutionalism by Replacement: Venezuela
President Hugo Chavez won an election in Venezuela in 1998 with
fifty-six percent of the vote, running as an independent against the
country’s traditional two-party system.47 The country had enjoyed a
fairly strong two-party democracy for several decades, but, by the time
Chavez was elected, the traditional two parties had lost support and
were battling a series of corruption scandals.48 Still, Chavez faced
43
See id. §§ 6.3.6.1, 6.3.7 (explaining the influence that a twelve-year presidency
would have on the Central Bank, Public Ministry, Constitutional Court, Prosecutor,
and other institutions).
44
See id.
45
See Eduardo Posada-Carbó, Colombia After Uribe, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2011, at
137.
46
See, e.g., David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative
Constitutional Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 338-39 (2010) (describing the role of the
Constitutional Court and other institutions like the Ombudsman within the
Colombian constitutional order).
47
See Michael Coppedge, Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty Versus Liberal
Democracy, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA 165, 167
(Jorge I. Dominguez & Michael Shifter eds., 2nd ed. 2003).
48
The country had lived under a pacted two-party democracy for several decades,
with the two major parties alternating power but excluding certain social groups —
particularly on the right — from exercising political control. The system enjoyed
substantial legitimacy for long periods of time, but, by the time Chavez was elected,
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opposition from members of the two parties, who continued to control
majorities in the national Congress, Supreme Court, state and local
governments, and other institutions.49 With the opposition controlling
most other institutions, Chavez was only weakly capable of carrying
out his agenda.
In order to neutralize this opposition, Chavez argued that the
existing Constitution should and could be replaced. The existing
Venezuelan Constitution provided only for amendment by Congress;
like most texts it said nothing about its own replacement.50 But
Chavez argued that the “people” retained an inherent constitutional
power to replace their constitutional text, and proposed a referendum
to determine whether elections for a Constituent Assembly should be
held. The Supreme Court agreed with the proposal, noting that the
public retained an “original constituent power” that was “prior and
superior to the established judicial regime,” and thus had the power to
replace their existing constitutional text.51 In subsequent cases,
however, the Court vacillated in defining the powers possessed by the
Assembly. It attempted to limit its power by holding that the Assembly
was “bound to the spirit of the Constitution in force, and therefore . . .
limited by the fundamental principles of the Democratic State of
Law.”52 These limitations never proved effectual, though, because the
had lost much of this due to economic crisis and because of a sense that the system
was serving only the interests of insiders. See generally MICHAEL COPPEDGE, STRONG
PARTIES AND LAME DUCKS: PRESIDENTIAL PARTYARCHY AND FACTIONALISM IN VENEZUELA
(1994) (explaining how the Venezuelan “partyarchy” over time eroded the legitimacy
of the regime).
49
See Coppedge, supra note 47, at 179 tbl.8.5 (showing that opposition group
continued to hold 118 of 188 seats in the House and 67 of 100 seats in the Senate).
50
See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA DE VENEZUELA, arts. 245, 246 (1961).
51
See Caso. Junta Directiva de la Fundación para los Derechos Humanos, Corte
Suprema de Justicia: Sala Político-Administrativa [Supreme Court of Justice: PoliticalAdministrative Chamber], 19 de Enero, 1999 (Venez.), reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE
DERECHO PUBLICO 56, 56-57 (1999).
52
Caso. Gerardo Blyde Pérez, Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala PolíticoAdministrativa [Supreme Court of Justice: Political-Administrative Chamber], 23 de
Marzo, 1999 (Venez.), available in 77-80 REVISTA DEL DERECHO PUBLICO 83, 84 (1999).
This language was used in a clarification of a ruling in an earlier case in which the
Court struck down the referendum questions formulated by Chavez. The second
question asked the public to vote on the convocation of a Constituent Assembly under
electoral rules that would subsequently be formulated by him. See Caso. Gerardo
Blyde, contra la Resolucion No 990217-32 del Consejo Nacional Electoral (17-2-99),
Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala Político-Administrativa [Supreme Court of Justice:
Political-Administrative Chamber], 18 de Marzo, 1999 (Venez.), reprinted in 77-80
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 73, 78-82 (1999). The Court held that this formula was
unconstitutional, because it would not guarantee that the Assembly would represent
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Court never used them to strike down an important act of Chavez or
of the Assembly.53 Once the Assembly had been actually convoked, the
Court would revert to its position that the Assembly was invested with
“original constituent power,” and thus could not be controlled by
existing institutions of state.54
Thus, Chavez wrote the rules for the election to the Assembly on his
own, and managed to engineer a set of electoral rules that were
immensely favorable to him: his party won sixty percent of votes, but
took over ninety percent of seats in the Assembly overall.55 Once
convoked, the Assembly focused on shutting down institutions still
controlled by the old two-party system: it suspended the Congress,
created a Council charged with purging the judiciary, removed statelevel officials, and eventually closed the Supreme Court itself.56 Some
of these actions were challenged in front of the Supreme Court, but
applying the “original constituent power” doctrine, it refused to step
in.57 Further, the new Constitution promulgated by Chavez abolished
“the true popular will.” Id. at 80.
53
The Court struck down symbolic measures, like one that defined the Assembly
as “an original power that carries popular sovereignty.” See Caso. Gerardo Blyde vs.
Consejo Supremo Electoral, Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala Político-Administrativa
[Supreme Court of Justice: Political-Administrative Chamber], 13 de Abril, 1999
(Venez.), reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 85, 85 (1999). In another
case, the Court held that statements made by Chavez on television failed to make clear
that the Assembly was subject to control by the existing constitutional order. See
Caso. Alberto Franceschi y Otros, Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala PolíticoAdministrativa [Supreme Court of Justice: Political-Administrative Chamber], 21 de
Julio, 1999, (Venez.), reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 104, 106, 110
(1999).
54
See Caso. Vicepresidente del Congreso de la República vs. Asamblea (decreto
25-8-99), Corte Suprema de Justicia: Sala Plena [Supreme Court of Justice: Plenary
Session], 14 de Octubre, 1999, (Venez.), reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PUBLICO 111, 111 (1999).
55
Renata Segura & Ana María Bejarano, ¡Ni una asemblea más sin nosotros!
Exclusion, Inclusion, and the Politics of Constitution-Making in the Andes, 11
CONSTELLATIONS 218, 225, 228-30 (2004).
56
As a prelude to these actions, Chavez placed his mandate at the disposal of the
Assembly, stating that it had the power to remove him from his post if it wished, since
it possessed sovereignty over all institutions of state. The surprised Assembly debated
the motion and “ratified” Chavez as president with zero “no” votes and three
abstentions. See Gaceta Constitucional, No. 5, August 9, 1999.
57
The closure of Congress was challenged in front of the Supreme Court, but the
full court refused to declare the action unconstitutional. See Caso. Vicepresidente del
Congreso de la República, reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO, at 120. As
the prominent Venezuelan legal scholar Allan Brewer-Carias noted, by so ruling the
Court essentially signed its own “death sentence,” paving the way for the abolition of
all other institutions that existed under the old order. See Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La
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the single four-year presidential term-limit found in the existing
constitution and replaced it with an allowance of two terms of six
years each, effectively allowing Chavez to stay in power for twelve
more years.58 It also greatly increased executive power, turning what
had been one of the weakest presidents in Latin America into one of
the strongest in the region.59 The entire constitution-making process
was completed in a span of only a few months, and since Chavez
controlled the Assembly, there was virtually no debate on most
provisions.60
The 1999 constitution-making process thus gave Chavez a legal
means to sweep the deck clean, removing opposition figures from
power and replacing them with institutions that he could control. In
that sense, it helped to shepherd in a competitive authoritarian regime,
where Chavez maintained power continuously until his death in 2013
and was able to control most other institutions in the country. He had
subsequently been able to use his power over the state to push
through other constitutional amendments that increased his power,
such as a 2009 package that removed term limits entirely.61
This tactic — replacing an existing constitution as a way to
consolidate power — has spread beyond Chavez to a variety of other
regimes in Latin America. Both Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo
Morales in Bolivia similarly relied on constitutional replacement as a
way to sweep away horizontal checks on their power and to
consolidate competitive authoritarian regimes.62 And as explored in
Configuración Judicial del Proceso Constituyente en Venezeual de 1999: O de Cómo el
Guárdian de la Constitución Abrió el Camino Para Su Violación y Para su Propia
Extinción, reprinted in 77-80 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO 453, 502 (1999).
58
See CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, art. 230. (1999).
59
See Katja S. Newman, Constitutional Coups: Advancing Executive Power in
Latin American Democracies 27-29 (May 7, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author), available at http://www.democracy.uci.edu/files/democracy/docs/
conferences/grad/2011/Newman%20CSD%202011%20Grad%20Conf%20CONSTITUT
IONAL%20COUPS.pdf (finding based on an index that presidential power was
increased by 121%).
60
See Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, at 941-49 (describing the
constitution-making process in Venezuela).
61
See, e.g., Allan R. Brewer-Carías, Venezuela 2009 Referendum on Continuous
Reelection: Constitutional Implications 4 (Feb. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author), available at http://ilas.columbia.edu/images/uploads/
workingpapers/Allan_Brewer-Carias-_Venezuela_2009_Referendum_on_Continuous_
Re-Election,_Constitutional_Implications.pdf (noting that the National Assembly used
the Constitutional Amendment procedure to “establish the possibility for the
indefinite and continuous reelection of the President of the Republic”).
62
See, e.g., Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, at 949-58 (describing
constitutional replacement in Bolivia).
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more detail below, Manuel Zelaya attempted to pursue a similar tactic
in Honduras before he was removed from power.63
The Ecuadorian case, for example, is illustrative of the same basic
strategy as the one used by Chavez in Venezuela. President Rafael
Correa won election as an outsider to another discredited political
system with fifty-two percent of the vote, and his movement ran
against the system to such an extent that it did not seek any
congressional seats.64 Once elected, Correa threatened the Congress
with dissolution, and proposed a referendum that would achieve that
goal and would also call a new Constituent Assembly to replace the
existing Constitution. Congress, faced with this pressure, caved, and
by majority vote allowed a referendum on whether a Constituent
Assembly should be called.65 Correa, however, then unilaterally
changed the terms of the referendum to include additional provisions,
such as one calling for the immediate dissolution of the Congress.
When Congress responded by beginning impeachment proceedings
against the President, he had the Supreme Electoral Tribunal — which
he controlled — remove fifty-seven members of Congress.66
As in Venezuela, the resulting constitutional text created a much
stronger presidency.67 As importantly, it gave Correa an opportunity to
pack all of the various institutions (including the Congress and
Constitutional Court) that would have checked his power. The result
is another competitive authoritarian regime; Ecuador continues to
hold elections, but the opposition is now facing a playing field that is
strongly tilted against it.68

63

See infra Part III.A.
See Agustín Grijalva, Courts and Political Parties: The Politics of Constitutional
Review in Ecuador 151-52 (April 14, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Pittsburgh) (on file with author), available at http://d-scholarship.pitt.
edu/7334/1/grijalva_agustin_2010_etd.pdf.
65
See Catherine M. Conaghan, Ecuador: Correa’s Plebiscitary Presidency, J.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2008, at 51.
66
See id. at 52. Moreover, when the Constitutional Tribunal attempted to
intervene on behalf of the removed Congressmen, the new Congress — which Correa
controlled — simply removed the justices by claiming that their terms had expired.
See Grijalva, supra note 64, at 153.
67
See Newman, supra note 59, at 27-28.
68
Steven Levitsky & James Loxton, Populism and Competitive Authoritarianism in
the Andes, 20 DEMOCRATIZATION 107, 121 (2013). Conaghan instead refers to Ecuador
as a “plebiscitary” democracy, explaining how Correa succeeded in weakening all
other branches of government and governing by taking his case directly to the people.
See Conaghan, supra note 65, at 47-48. Regardless of label, however, Correa’s actions
have weakened democracy in a particular way.
64
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D. A Combination of Reform and Replacement: Hungary
In Hungary, the Fidesz Party won the Parliamentary elections of
2010 with fifty-three percent of the vote. They ousted the previously
governing Socialists, who had presided over a deteriorating economy.
However, because of the way that the Hungarian voting rules worked,
the fifty-three percent of the vote translated into sixty-eight percent of
the seats, a sufficient supermajority to amend the existing
Constitution.69 The Fidesz Party has had a checkered and
opportunistic ideological past: it began as a Libertarian party after the
transition from Communism, but became a Conservative party after
suffering early electoral defeats.70
Although the Fidesz Party had not campaigned on a platform of
constitutional change, it began moving towards radical constitutional
reform after winning the 2010 election. It first enacted a series of
constitutional amendments — ten in the closing months of 2010 —
that weakened institutions serving to check parliamentary majorities,
particularly the Constitutional Court.71 The Parliament reformed the
Constitution to give Fidesz members more unilateral power over the
nomination process, and after the Court struck down a retroactive tax
on bonuses received by departing civil servants, the Parliament
responded by passing a constitutional amendment stripping most of
the Court’s jurisdiction over fiscal and budgetary matters.72 The Court
was asked to strike down this amendment on the ground that it was
substantively unconstitutional because it was severely at variance with
the existing constitutional order, but a majority of the Court declined
to adopt that doctrine and held that it could only review constitutional
amendments for procedural problems.73
69

The voting rules in place gave majoritarian boosts to the party gaining a
plurality of votes, thus helping the Fidesz gain extra seats. See Miklós Bánkuti et al.,
Disabling the Constitution, J. DEMOCRACY, July 2012, at 139.
70
See, e.g., Csilla Kiss, From Liberalism to Conservatism: The Federation of Young
Democrats in Post-Communist Hungary, 16 E. EUR. POL. & SOC’Y 739, 741-44 (2002)
(tracing the ideological shifts in the Fidesz).
71
The Parliament also passed a number of laws that had important effects on the
democratic order. For example, a set of media laws concerned critics, as they
potentially reduced the independence of media outlets. See, e.g., Judy Dempsey,
Hungary Waves off Criticism Over Media Laws, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/26/world/europe/26hungary.html?_r=0.
72
See Gábor Halmai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: Constitutional
Courts as Guardians of the Constitution?, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 182, 191-92 (2012).
73
See id. at 195-96. The majority of the Court suggested that there were
immutable parts of the constitutional order, but held that it was beyond its power to
actually enforce those limits.
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The Fidesz majority then went forward with a plan for
constitutional replacement — using its two-thirds majority in
Parliament, it began writing an entirely new text.74 The process was
widely criticized for not being inclusive; the party used a
parliamentary device to evade most deliberation on the bill, and
almost no input was received from opposition political forces.75 As in
the Venezuelan case, the new Constitution both undermines
horizontal checks on the majority and may help it to perpetuate itself
in power indefinitely. The new Constitution expands the size of the
Constitutional Court, thus giving the ruling party additional seats to
fill.76 It also creates a new National Judicial Office, controlled by the
party, and one with broad powers over both judicial selection and the
assignment of cases within the ordinary judiciary.77 The judicial
74
Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success,
Partial Failure, and Now What?, 26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 19, 43 (2010). The Hungarian
constitutional situation was peculiar; the country never wrote a new constitution
when it transitioned to democracy, but instead maintained the old, Communist-era
constitution with massive amendments. The old Constitution thus openly
contemplated its replacement, but no such replacement materialized during the first
twenty years of the democratic regime. See id. at 27-28 (exploring why no permanent
constitution was ever enacted). The Fidesz also used its two-thirds majority to amend
a part of the old Constitution, which had probably already ceased to have any effect,
requiring approval of four-fifths of Parliament in order to “establish the rules and
procedures for the preparation of a new Constitution.” See A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG
ALKOTMÁNYA [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY] (1995), art. 24, cl. 5
(stating that the four-fifths requirement would expire when the Parliament elected in
1994 ended). But see Andew Arato, Arato on Constitution-Making in Hungary and the
4/5ths Rule, COMP. CONSTS. BLOG (Apr. 6, 2012, 7:19 AM), http://www.
comparativeconstitutions.org/2011/04/arato-on-constitution-making-in-hungary.html
(arguing that the four-fifths rule might still have life).
75
See EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMM’N), Opinion on
Three Legal Questions Arising in the Process of Drafting the New Constitution, 86th Sess.,
Op. No. 614/2011, at 4-5 (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2011)001-e (raising concerns about the lack of opposition
participation in the process, the lack of transparency, and the tight time-frame within
which the Constitution was being drafted).
76
See MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY]
[CONSTITUTION] (2011), art. 24, § 4 (expanding the size of the Court from eleven to
fifteen members).
77
Note that the National Judicial Office was created and defined by a cardinal law,
rather than by the Constitution. The Constitution required the creation of cardinal
laws to govern various areas, and the Constitution requires a two-thirds majority to
either write or amend these cardinal laws. Id. art. T, § 4; see also EUR. COMM’N FOR
DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMM’N), Opinion on Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal
Status and Remuneration of Judges and Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and
Administration of Courts of Hungary, 90th Sess., Op. No. 663/2012, at 7-8 (Mar. 19,
2012),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2012)001-e

210

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:189

retirement age was reduced from seventy to sixty-two, giving the
National Judicial Office a large number of vacancies to fill in a short
period of time.78 Other key institutions, like the Electoral
Commission, Budget Commission, and Media Board, have been restaffed with Fidesz loyalists and often given very long terms of twelve
years.79 Finally, new rules adjust the electoral districts in ways that
would have substantially increased their share of the vote in each of
the past three elections, thus potentially making the Fidesz harder to
dislodge in the future.80
This effort has provoked some responses both domestically and
internationally. Domestically, the Constitutional Court for the timebeing retains sufficient independence to issue some important rulings
against the regime. For example, the Court struck down the effort to
lower the retirement age to sixty-two, although it issued a weak
remedy that appeared to have no effect on the judges already removed
from the bench.81 It also struck down a new voter-registration law that
seemed designed to further tilt the electoral balance in the Fidesz’s

(expressing concerns about the institution).
78
EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION), Opinion on the
New Constitution of Hungary, Op. No. 621/2011, at 22 (June 20, 2011),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2011)016-e [hereinafter
New Constitution of Hungary] (expressing concern over this development because it
“may undermine the operational capacity of the courts and affect continuity and legal
security and might also open the way for undue influence on the composition of the
judiciary”).
79
See, e.g., Bánkuti et al., supra note 69, at 140-44 (explaining how these
institutions were packed). Yet other institutions, like the National Ombudsman’s
Office, were greatly weakened. Id. at 144.
80
For an analysis of the new electoral districts, see, for example, Viktor Szigetvári
et al., Beyond Democracy — The Model of the New Hungarian Parliamentary
Electoral System 1, 12-13 (Nov. 24, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author),
available
at
http://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/Beyond%
20democracy%20-%2027%20Nov%202011.pdf (finding that the Fidesz would have
won each of the last three elections, including two that it actually lost, if the new
electoral districts had been in place).
81
See Kim Lane Scheppele, How to Evade the Constitution: The Hungarian
Constitutional Court’s Decision on Retirement Age, VERFASSUNGS BLOG (Aug. 9, 2012),
http://www.verfassungsblog.de/de/how-to-evade-the-constitution-the-hungarianconstitutional-courts-decision-on-judicial-retirement-age-part-i/#.UQiH2Wfiv3U
(noting that judicial reinstatement was now winding its way through the ordinary
judiciary with no certainty of success, and that the newly appointed judges would not
be removed at any rate). Note that the European Court of Justice later issued a
decision striking down the same move as age discrimination which was not
proportionate to the achievement of any legitimate social policy. See Case C-286/12,
Comm’n v. Hungary, 2012 CELEX WL 612CJ0286 (Nov. 6, 2012).
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favor.82 Internationally, various institutions of the European Union
and the Council of Europe have searched for an appropriate response.
The Venice Commission, created to give constitutional assistance to
the transitional democracies in Eastern Europe, has criticized certain
parts of the new text and related laws,83 while enforcement
proceedings were brought against certain elements of the program,
especially those that reduced the independence of the Central Bank
and lowered the retirement age for judges to sixty-two.84 In response,
the Fidesz has modified some of its policies.85
We do not know whether the result of the Hungarian case will be
the creation of a competitive authoritarian regime, but the intent was
clearly to move in that direction. It may be difficult for a member of
the European Union to move too far in the direction of
authoritarianism, although it is startling how successful the Fidesz has
been in carrying out this goal within a short period of time.
E. Abusive Constitutionalism and Modern Authoritarianism
Why is it that constitutionalism, which is normally associated with
the rise and consolidation of democratic regimes, is in these cases so
strongly associated with moves towards competitive authoritarian or
hybrid regimes? Scholars have doubted the value of constitutional
rules to the competitive authoritarian project. For example, political
scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way argue that formal rules are
relatively unimportant to competitive authoritarian regimes because
these regimes tend to rely on informal sets of norms to perpetuate
82
Margit Feher, Hungary Court Throws out Mandatory Voter Registration, WALL ST.
J. EMERGING EUR. BLOG (Jan. 4, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/
2013/01/04/hungary-court-throws-out-mandatory-voter-registration/.
83
See EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMM’N), New
Constitution of Hungary, supra note 78, at 28-29 (giving a balanced assessment of the
new constitution, praising certain elements while expressing serious concern about
the reforms to the judiciary and certain other elements).
84
See sources cited supra note 81 (explaining the European Court of Justice case
striking down the lowered mandatory retirement age for judges); see also EU Opens
Legal Action Against Hungary Over New Laws, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-europe-16593827 (last updated Jan. 17, 2012, 10:40 AM).
85
See, e.g., Andrew Clapham, Council of Europe Cites Hungary’s Progress on
Judiciary, Media, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2013, 4:49 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-01-29/council-of-europe-cites-hungary-s-progress-on-judiciary-media.html
(noting amendments to the laws in both areas in light of discussions with European
officials); EU Closes Central Bank Infringement Case, EUBUSINESS.COM (July 19, 2012,
3:46 PM), http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/hungary-economy.ht0/ (stating that
amendments to the Central Bank law had allayed the concerns of the European
Commission).
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themselves in power.86 They argue that in these kinds of regimes, the
formal rules “designed to constrain governments [are] frequently
circumvented, manipulated, or dismantled.”87 As an example,
competitive authoritarian regimes tend to possess democratic-looking
constitutions with structural features such as the separation of powers,
but take informal measures to neutralize the value of those checks.
Rulers can appoint friendly judges to courts, and can neutralize judges
representing opposing interests by, for example, bribing them or
threatening them. Similarly, these regimes might hold elections, and
because of monitoring and other incentives, might avoid blatant fraud
on election day itself. But they rely on state control over the media and
over the largesse of state resources, as well as intimidation and
harassment of opposition figures, to nonetheless make incumbents
very difficult to dislodge.88 There is no doubt, then, that these regimes
do rest largely on informal sets of norms and incentives.
Yet the examples given above, as well as other examples drawn upon
by scholars, offer ample evidence that constitutionalism is often a key
part of these projects.89 It is a mistake to ignore the importance of
formal constitutional rules to hybrid regimes. For one thing, formal
constitutional rules define incumbents’ tenure in office, power over
other institutions, and other variables. Thus in Colombia, Uribe’s
ability to leverage informal mechanisms, such as patronage, to control
other institutions of state, like courts and ombudsmen, was dependent
on his ability to remain in office indefinitely, and thus he continuously
sought constitutional reform in order to allow presidential reelection.90 In Venezuela and Ecuador, the new constitutions
strengthened the presidents’ power considerably, giving incumbent
executives power to legislate around existing institutions.91 And in
86
See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 25, at 78-81 (arguing that “there is reason to be
skeptical about the impact of the institutional design in competitive authoritarian
regimes”).
87
Id. at 79.
88
See William Case, Manipulative Skills: How Do Rulers Control the Electoral
Arena?, in ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM, supra note 25, at 95, 99-104 (listing
techniques for controlling elections that generally fall short of election-day fraud).
89
For other examples of the use of constitutionalism in the construction of
weakly democratic regimes, see, for example, Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note
1, at 938-39 (examining this phenomenon in Bolivia, Venezuela, and perhaps now
Egypt); William Partlett, The Dangers of Popular Constitution-Making, 38 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 193, 209-33 (2012) (discussing Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and other postSoviet countries).
90
See supra text accompanying note 36.
91
See supra notes 59, 67 (noting the increase in executive power in both
Venezuela and Ecuador).
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Hungary, the new constitutional order weakened or disabled some of
the checking institutions, giving the Fidesz more power.92
Moreover, constitutional change can be used to either dismantle or
pack institutions serving as strongholds for the opposition. The
weakening or removal of opposition figures is instrumental to the
construction of competitive authoritarian regimes because it gives
incumbents a greatly increased power to rework the state to their
advantage. The examples described above show that constitutional
replacement can be a particularly efficient way for political actors to
entrench themselves in power and to overcome political opposition,
and thus is likely more dangerous than constitutional amendment.
First and foremost, constitutional replacement gives dominant actors a
chance to sweep away the power bases of opposition groups. Chavez
in Venezuela, Correa in Ecuador, and the Fidesz in Hungary all gained
control over a core branch or branches of government by winning
elections, but they did not have initial control over the entire state.
Key institutions, such as legislatures (in the presidential system),
courts, ombudsmen, electoral tribunals, and state and local officials
(in federal Venezuela) remained outside of their grasp.
Rewriting the constitution gave these would-be authoritarian actors
a chance to weaken or remove some of these institutions and to pack
others. By shifting from one constitutional order to another, rulers
could argue that existing office-holders in these institutions no longer
held a valid grip on power and could legitimately be replaced, a
technique that Chavez and his Constituent Assembly used extensively
in Venezuela.93 They could also change the size of existing
institutions, as the Fidesz did with the Constitutional Court in
Hungary.94 Or they could close down existing institutions entirely and
create new ones with weaker powers. The trick, as well, is that
packing or dismantling a single institution will rarely have serious
consequences for democracy, but sweeping away large parts of the
institutional order — as was done in all of these cases — may allow
rulers to entrench themselves in power for long periods of time.
In short, constitutional change needs to be viewed as a core part of
modern authoritarian projects. Powerful individuals or groups can
abuse constitution-making to create constitutional orders in which
they face few constraints on their power and in which they will be
difficult or impossible to dislodge. This new construction of formal

92
93
94

See supra text accompanying notes 71–82.
See supra text accompanying notes 56–57.
See supra note 76.
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rules works in tandem with informal norms such as bribery and
harassment within competitive authoritarian regimes.
One could respond by saying that abusive constitutionalism is
simply an act of normal constitutionalism, and thus not a real cause
for concern. Constitutional orders should be open to change for
various reasons, including technological and social change, or simply
deep-rooted shifts in the values and interests of a population.95 Yet
there are several reasons why the kinds of changes involved here are
particularly dangerous. First, they appear to weaken the degree to
which a regime is democratic over long periods of time. Constitutional
change of this type weakens institutions and allows the construction
of an uneven playing field, whereby incumbents enjoy large electoral
advantages over their opponents. It seems likely that these effects
persist even after the original incumbent at issue has been ousted.96
Second, the identification of abusive constitutional change with any
kind of enduring popular will is problematic. Incumbents capitalize on
transient surges in their popularity to push through changes that
impact the democratic order. They also manipulate electoral law and
other mechanisms to inflate their support. In Hungary, for example,
the Fidesz won only fifty-three percent of the vote, but sixty-eight
percent of the seats because of a set of electoral rules that were
designed to encourage majoritarian governance by rewarding winning
parties with additional seats.97 The party’s approval rating has since
dropped sharply, although it would still win hypothetical pluralities
against other parties.98 This did not represent a durable mandate for
95
See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Constitutional Amendment Rules: A Comparative
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 96, 97-102 (Tom Ginsburg &
Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (explaining the various purposes behind constitutional
amendment rules).
96
As an example, one might consider Russia, where then-President Boris Yeltsin
was able to take the constitution-making process out of the elected Parliament and
into a handpicked special Assembly after winning a popular referendum. See Partlett,
supra note 89, at 210-26 (explaining the Russian constitution-making process and
how it went wrong); see also Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Constitutional Courts in the
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 117, 136-37 (2001) (explaining how the Russian constitutional court was
nullified as part of the Russian constitution-making process). The constitutional order
Yeltsin constructed, which contained both a very strong president and weak checking
institutions, has continued to leave its imprint on Russian politics, long after Yeltsin
left the scene. Russia continues to be a competitive authoritarian regime under Putin.
See Valerie J. Bunce & Sharon L. Wolchik, Defeating Dictators: Electoral Change and
Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes, 62 WORLD POL. 43, 44 (2010) (noting
that Russia remains a competitive authoritarian regime).
97
See Miklós Bánkuti et al., supra note 69, at 138-39.
98
See Hungary Government Party Support Lowest in Over a Decade — Poll, REUTERS
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the kind of change that the Fidesz was subsequently able to carry out.
Similarly, in Venezuela, Chavez won an election with only fifty-six
percent of the national vote. His candidates then won sixty percent of
votes in an election for a Constituent Assembly that was largely
boycotted by the opposition, but this translated into over ninety
percent of seats due to electoral rules handcrafted by Chavez himself.99
The Constituent Assembly process, in which a single electoral group
steamrolled the insignificant opposition, was not representative of any
strong social consensus in favor of Chavez’s formula. Like the Fidesz,
he effectively capitalized on a momentary surge in popularity to alter
the shape of the democracy over the long haul.
The argument against abusive constitutionalism does not depend on
the particular policies pursued by these actors, but merely on the fact
that they are making their regimes significantly less democratic.
Chavez and Correa are leftist populists, Uribe is a right-leaning
neoliberal, and the Fidesz party is a right-wing nationalist movement.
There may be merit in some of the policies followed by these actors,
and not in others.100 Regardless of policy orientation, the deterioration
of both the public’s ability to vote these incumbents out and the
weakening of horizontal checks that are supposed to hold them
accountable is a substantial cause for concern. The absence of both
vertical and horizontal checks appears to be related to a long list of
negative outcomes: deterioration in the quality of policy, less
responsiveness of politicians to the will of the public, and a higher
incidence of human rights abuses.101
If I am correct both that the creation of hybrid forms of
authoritarianism through mechanisms of constitutional change is
increasingly common and that these kinds of authoritarian regimes
represent a threat about which we ought to be concerned, then the
remaining key question is how to stop it. This is, of course, the million
dollar question, and I spend the rest of this article tackling it. Parts II
and III survey mechanisms of democratic defense in both comparative
constitutional law and international law. My core conclusion is
(June 7, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/07/oukwd-uk-hungary-partiesidAFBRE8560F420120607.
99
See Segura & Bejarano, supra note 55, at 225 (describing how Chavez managed
to manipulate the constitution-making process in Venezuela).
100
See, e.g., GREGORY WILPERT, CHANGING VENEZUELA BY TAKING POWER: THE
HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE CHÁVEZ GOVERNMENT (2007) (defending the thrust of
Chavez’s political policies).
101
See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 25, at 25-26 (observing the relationship between
regimes that are not particularly competitive electorally and illiberalism, where
regimes do not observe basic human rights).
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unsettling — the existing tools at both levels are not very effective at
controlling this threat. Moreover, the flexible nature of abusive
constitutionalism (for example, the fact that there are often multiple
ways for would-be authoritarians to achieve the same goal) makes it a
difficult threat to combat.
II.

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF RESPONSES IN COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

In this Part, I survey key aspects of comparative constitutional
design and scholarship that are supposed to make democratic
constitutionalism resistant to erosion from within.102 My main
conclusion is that these tools are largely ineffective against the threat
posed by abusive constitutionalism. The next Part conducts a similar
analysis of solutions and potential solutions at the international level.
The post–World War II generation of constitutional scholarship
developed the German conception of militant democracy, which holds
that states may actively root out threats posed by illiberal or
undemocratic groups attempting to use the forms of democracy to
achieve their goals. The paradigm case, of course, was the Nazi’s
overthrow of the democratic Weimar Republic from within. The most
important manifestation of militant democracy is in modern partybanning clauses, which generally allow constitutional courts to
prohibit political parties with aims that run counter to the
fundamental values of the democratic state. As I show below in section
II(A), this kind of clause is of very limited value against the threat of
abusive constitutionalism. The movements and parties that bear the
fruit of abusive constitutionalism are generally too big, and their
platforms too ambiguous, to be reasonably banned from the political
sphere. Militant democracy is more effectively deployed against
ideologically-charged threats to democracy, which are not as common
today as they were during the beginning and middle of the twentieth
century.
More recent work has focused on controlling the mechanisms of
constitutional amendment and change in order to fortify them against
abusive constitutional maneuvering. The state-of-the-art here is a
conception of constitutional change that one might call “selective
102

I bracket here the rich literature on how different forms of government
structure might affect a polity’s likelihood of downfall. See, e.g., Juan L. Linz,
Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?, in THE FAILURE OF
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 3 (Juan L. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela eds., 1994)
(concluding that presidential systems are more likely to be overthrown than
parliamentary systems, and theorizing reasons for this difference).
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rigidity.” In a selectively rigid order, the basic amendment threshold is
set fairly low, allowing updating of constitutional texts. But core parts
of the democratic order can be protected by two different methods:
tiered amendment thresholds and the doctrine of unconstitutionalconstitutional amendments. The first method uses textual provisions
to especially entrench certain vulnerable provisions by requiring
higher supermajorities or other mechanisms. The second allows courts
to strike down certain constitutional amendments that threaten the
democratic order as substantively unconstitutional. Both mechanisms
have become well-known within comparative constitutional law as
ways to defend the democratic order against threats from within.
In sections II(B) through II(D), I show that these tools, as well, are
only of limited use in protecting against abusive constitutionalism. At
least as currently practiced, both have significant weaknesses, which
can be exploited by would-be authoritarian actors. Tiered
constitutional amendment thresholds are often used to protect
expressive values like the right to human dignity, rather than the
kinds of provisions — like tenure protections for constitutional courts
— that abusive constitutional practices tend to target. And given the
fungibility of abusive constitutional practices — there are often many
ways to achieve the same goals — it would be difficult to design an
effective textual regime.
The unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine is
intended to fill these gaps by giving courts a more flexible tool to
respond to abusive constitutional practices. But both theory and
experience suggests a real risk that courts cannot be depended upon to
apply the doctrine in warranted cases, but rather will be both overand under-inclusive. Moreover, the theoretical justification for tight
control over constitutional amendments suggests a distinction
between constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement
that does not hold up in practice. Both are susceptible to abusive
constitutional practice, as the Hungarian and Venezuelan cases show
in Part I. Thus, the unconstitutional-constitutional amendments
doctrine is likely to prove effective only if paired with restrictions on
constitutional replacement. Such restrictions rarely exist. In short, we
are a long way from developing a coherent system to control
constitutional change, and it may not be feasible to construct such a
system.
A. Militant Democracy and Party Banning
In comparative constitutional law, the German concept of militant
democracy has been the major defense mechanism for democratic
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orders. It was invented in Germany following the end of World War II,
and the obvious impetus was the way that the inter-war Weimar
Republic was undermined and then overthrown by the antidemocratic Nazi party during the 1920s and 1930s.103 Militant
democracy is a rich concept with many elements, centered on a refusal
to allow anti-democratic elements to use the freedoms and tools of
democracy in order to destroy the democratic order.104
However, most recent scholarship has focused on party-banning, or
the ability of a constitutional court to dissolve parties that are
considered essentially anti-democratic. The German Basic Law, for
example, gives its Constitutional Court the power to ban parties that
“by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to
undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger
the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany.”105 This provision
was used to ban Neo-Nazi and Communist parties in the 1950s,106 and
103
The Nazi experience also impelled structural innovations in the design of
parliamentary politics, such as the constructive vote of no confidence, which requires
that actors seeking to bring down a democratic regime must first suggest an
alternative government. See Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional
Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1860 (2010)
(discussing the possibilities for adopting the constructive vote of no confidence in the
United States as a way to allow Congress to limit presidential power).
104
The party-banning clause emphasized here does not exhaust the reach of the
model, but it is its most canonical element. The model, for example, also allows for
restrictions on fundamental rights and the freedom of association for individuals and
groups that take action against the democratic order. See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl.
I (Ger.) arts. 9, 11, 18. The German Constitutional Court has referred to the concept
in contexts that are very far afield from party-banning, for example in the data mining
context. Thus, the term has been given recent relevance as part of a package of antiterrorism measures. See, e.g., Russell A. Miller, Balancing Security and Liberty in
Germany, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 369, 371-75 (2010) (looking at constitutional
provisions allowing limitations on association and freedom of movement in light of
post-9/11 security concerns); András Sajó, From Militant Democracy to the Preventive
State?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2255, 2255-56 (2006) (theorizing a broad set of responses
of a militant democracy to terrorist threats); Paul M. Schwartz, Regulating Govermental
Data Mining in the United States and Germany: Constitutional Courts, the State, and New
Technology, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 351, 380-81 (2011) (considering German
jurisprudence on data screening practices in light of militant democracy principles).
105
GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) art. 21.
106
See Communist Party Case, 5 BVerfGE 85 (1956); Socialist Reich Party Case, 2
BVerfGE 1 (1952), in THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 286, 286-89 (Donald P. Kommers & Russell A. Miller eds., 3d ed. 2012). See
generally Judith Wise, Dissent and the Militant Democracy: The German Constitution and
the Banning of the Free German Workers Party, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 301, 30203 (1998) (discussing the latter decision).
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these provisions have been utilized in either the same or modified
form in a number of countries like India, Israel, and Turkey.107 Samuel
Issacharoff has recently put these provisions at the center of his
scheme for the defense of “fragile democracies,” arguing that they may
be abused in some cases, but if used properly, can prevent regimes
from being taken over by anti-democratic forces.108 Similarly, Gregory
Fox and Georg Nolte argue that party-banning of anti-democratic
movements was clearly allowed by international law under certain
circumstances, and likewise argued for its practical importance in
preventing anti-democratic forces from taking over the state.109
The argument of this section is that these provisions may be useful
against traditional authoritarian or totalitarian threats carried by
ideologically anti-democratic parties such as the Nazis, but are much
less useful against the modern threats posed by abusive
constitutionalism. The reasons are two-fold: First, unlike movements
such as the Nazis, parties and actors that lead abusive constitutional
movements have ambiguous platforms that are not clearly antidemocratic in nature. In other words, the party-banning concept
assumes that one can determine which parties are essentially antidemocratic. This worked reasonably well with movements that
espoused fundamental alternatives to democracy, such as Communism
or National Socialism. But these sorts of movements are now rare;
virtually all parties and movements now espouse at least a rhetorical
commitment to democracy in some form. None of the movements
examined in Part I were led by actors who rejected democracy.110
Similarly, large Islamic movements such as the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood are mainly a threat to democracy not because of their
ideology, but because they possess disproportionate power in a weak
political environment.111 Like the abusive constitutionalist projects
studied in Part I, the threat is not that they will overthrow democracy,
but rather that they will bend it to their own concerns. The abusive
constitutionalism project is not fueled by an alternative ideology, but
instead by situational factors — the ability to dominate the political
107

See, e.g., Patrick Macklem, Militant Democracy, Legal Pluralism, and the Paradox
of Self-Determination, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 488, 493-94 (2006) (surveying constitutional
provisions allowing for party banning).
108
See Issacharoff, Democracies, supra note 6, at 1466-67.
109
See Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J.
1, 2 (1995).
110
See supra Part I.B–D.
111
Cf. Jamie O’Connell, Common Interests, Closer Allies: How Democracy in Arab
States Can Benefit the West, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 341, 389 (2012) (stating that the
Muslim Brotherhood has adopted “notably democratic internal procedures”).
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space in a country, and to use that space to entrench themselves in
power for long periods of time. But this poses a serious problem for
any efforts to ban such parties, because it means that they are difficult
to identify by standard tools, such as party platforms, and that any
effort to ban them is likely to prove grossly over-inclusive.
Second, unlike most anti-democratic parties, which are fringe
movements that are initially quite small, abusive constitutional
movements tend to be carried by large majoritarian movements with
substantial popular support.112 This means that attempts to ban such
parties may themselves be destabilizing to the democratic order.
Banning fringe parties may not matter much, since the small number
of adherents may simply shift to more mainstream options. But a court
that bans majoritarian and centrist movements is likely to be playing
some variant of what has been called the “impossible game” — the
large number of supporters will not accept an electoral regime without
their player in it, and their protests will eventually force the regime to
either become more repressive or to let the banned party back in.113
Either way, the effort will fail in its core purpose.
The Turkish experience with party-banning, which is the richest
and most interesting among modern countries, offers instructive
examples of both problems: the problem of identifying a competitive
authoritarian movement as anti-democratic, and the problem of trying
to ban majoritarian movements.114 In a series of important cases
beginning in 1998, the Turkish Supreme Court banned significant
political movements with widespread support. The rationale for these
cases was that the movements at issue were Islamic in orientation, and
thus contrary to the secular substantive values of the Turkish state. Yet
unlike the Neo-Nazi and Socialist Party cases in Germany, the parties
at issue in the Turkish cases were not fringe or extreme movements.
They received substantial numbers of votes. The Welfare Party, for
112
Consider the movements led by Chavez in Part I.C or the Fidesz in Part I.D —
neither was ideologically extreme and both received substantial popular support.
113
See RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DAVID COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA:
CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA
487-88 (1991) (referring to the “impossible game” as the problem of the Argentine
Peronist Party being unable to win elections because of its repugnance to elites despite
previously being the majority party).
114
The discussion here does not exhaust the Turkish experience with partybanning. In another series of decisions, for example, the country banned separatist
parties associated with the Kurds. See Ödül Celep, The Political Causes of Party
Closures in Turkey, PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 1, 13-16 (2012) (collecting and discussing
decisions). These decisions raise questions of constitutional theory that are important
but distinct — many of those who would defend bans on anti-democratic parties see
bans of minority separatist parties as inherently more problematic.
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example, won twenty-one percent of the vote and about one-third of
the seats in 1995, and joined a majority coalition with a center-right
secularist party, the True Path Party.115 The Welfare Party’s thenleader, Necmettin Erbakan, became prime minister.116 After the
military, trade unions, and business associations formed a common
front against the Islamist party, the military declared Islamic parties to
be anathema to core state values in 1997, and forced the party to
resign from the ruling coalition.117 It was banned by the Constitutional
Court in 1998, and this decision was upheld by the European Court of
Human Rights.118
The European Court’s decision upholding the ban is a troubling use
of the militant democracy conception. It began by offering a ringing
endorsement of militant democracy in the German mold: “[T]he
Court considers that it is not at all improbable that totalitarian
movements, organized in the form of political parties, might do away
with democracy, after prospering under the democratic regime, there
being examples of this in modern European history.”119 Further, the
Court held that “a State cannot be required to wait, before intervening,
until a political party has seized power and begun to take concrete
steps to implement a policy incompatible with the standards of the
Convention and democracy, even though the danger of that policy for
democracy is sufficiently established and imminent.”120
The decision becomes problematic in actually applying the militant
democracy principles to the Welfare Party.121 The Court emphasized
115
See Saban Taniyici, Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Islamist Welfare
Party’s Pro-EU Turn, 9 PARTY POL. 463, 471-72 (2003).
116
See id. at 466, 472.
117
See Mehran Kamrava, Pseudo-Democratic Politics and Populist Possibilities: The
Rise and Demise of Turkey’s Refah Party, 25 BRIT. J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 275, 275 (1998)
(referring to this incident as a “soft coup”).
118
See Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98,
41343/98, 41344/98, § 133-36, ECHR 2003. This was in fact a grand chamber decision
upholding an earlier decision made by a panel. See generally Refah Partisi (The
Welfare Party) v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98, ECHR 2001
(laying out the prior panel decision).
119
Refah Partisi, ECHR 2003, § 99.
120
Id. § 102.
121
A substantial literature examines the decision from a religious perspective,
debating whether the Court overreacted to the threat of Islamic parties in Europe and
thus allowed undue infringement on religious liberty. See, e.g., Peter G. Danchin,
Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L.
663, 699 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he Court’s analysis misconstrues the true nature of
the conflict in Turkey, which, quite apart from questions of liberal rights and
freedoms, centers on the locus of Islam as a source of political legitimacy among
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that the party already had substantial support and had joined a
majority coalition, and was likely poised to win large majorities in the
near future. To the Court, this strengthened the case for a ban because
it showed that the party might be able to actually implement its
program; the Court did not, however, discuss the difficulties involved
in banning an already very popular party.122 The Court then discussed
in detail the party’s program, finding that its religious orientation and
especially its adherence to variants of sharia law rendered it antidemocratic. The Court noted that members of the party had made
statements suggesting alteration of the legal system to recognize
religious-based law to govern status and certain other private law
questions and had praised sharia law.123 At root, the Court thought
that the platform was religious in a way that was incompatible with
democracy: “The Court concurs in the . . . view that sharia is
incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy.”124
The decision thus lays bare both the line-drawing and size
problems. First, it is unclear whether the Welfare Party’s platform
really was anti-democratic. The allowance of separate religious status
courts in certain areas is used in many democracies, including
Israel,125 and the modern Middle East is working towards finding a
role for sharia law within democratic orders.126 While the Court did
find that some members of the party had suggested, in ambiguous
different elite groups in the historical context of Kemalism as a state-building
project”); Claudia E. Haupt, Transnational Nonestablishment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
991, 1009-10 (2012) (arguing that the decision heralded a nonestablishment model in
the Court’s jurisprudence).
122
See Refah Partisi, ECHR 2003, § 107-10.
123
See id. § 120-25. For example, the party’s leader, Necmettin Erbakan, had made
statements to the following effect: “We shall guarantee to everyone the right to live as
he sees fit and to choose the legal system he prefers . . . . When we are in power a
Muslim will be able to get married before the mufti, if he wishes, and a Christian will
be able to marry in church, if he prefers.” Id. § 28.
124
Id. § 123.
125
See, e.g., GARY J. JACOBSOHN, THE WHEEL OF LAW: INDIA’S SECULARISM IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 72-88 (2003) (explaining the Israeli system of
religious status courts); see also Daphne Barak-Erez, Law and Religion Under the Status
Quo Model: Between Past Compromises and Constant Change, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2495,
2497 (2009). This model of course creates tensions with democratic values, but that
does not necessarily make it incompatible with democracy in all its incarnations.
126
See generally RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY (2010) (explaining
ways in which courts are used to channel and control religious law in the Middle
East); Kristen Stilt, “Islam is the Solution”: Constitutional Visions of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 73 (2010) (noting considerable vagueness in the
platform of the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus finding it difficult to figure out exactly
how their platform meshes with democratic values).
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terms, the use of force or other extra-legal measures to gain power, it
put little weight on this conclusion and had little support for it.127 The
party was identifiably religious; it was probably not identifiably antidemocratic. Further, the Court does little to explain why the banning
of such a significant party, representing a broad swath of Turkish
society, is likely to be effective.
Instead of disappearing, elements of the Welfare Party formed a
successor party, called the Virtue Party. The Virtue Party continued to
espouse an Islamist agenda and contained many of the same actors as
had earlier held power in the Welfare Party. The party did well in the
1999 elections, winning fifteen percent of the vote and 111 of the 450
parliamentary seats.128 But it was again banned by the Constitutional
Court, which held that, although it was identifiably different from the
old Welfare Party, it too had a fundamentally Islamic platform.129 Even
after being banned a second time, the party did not disappear, but
instead elements of it reformed as the Justice and Development Party,
which has controlled Turkish politics with an absolute majority of the
Parliament since the 2002 general elections.130 The party controlled
363 of 550 seats in 2002, 341 of 550 seats in 2007, and 327 of 550
seats in 2011.131
Defenders of the party-banning paradigm, most notably Samuel
Issacharoff, have argued that the Turkish case shows that it does work
under modern scenarios, because the successive emanations of the
party moderated somewhat from their previous incarnations.132 This is
true, but may miss the larger point: the core interests represented by
the party survived and it took power within a fairly short period of
time. Moreover, one of the biggest problems now faced in modern
Turkish politics is the predominant role of the Justice and
127
See Refah Partisi, ECHR 2003, § 130-31 (concluding, after canvassing relevant
speeches, that “there was ambiguity in the terminology used to refer to the method to
be employed to gain political power”).
128
See Birol A. Ye ilada, The Virtue Party, 3 TURKISH STUD. 62, 75 tbl.1 (2002).
129
See Asli Ü. Bâli, The Perils of Judicial Independence: Constitutional Transition and
the Turkish Example, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 235, 281 n.156 (2012).
130
See Ergun Özbudun, From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of
the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, 11 S. EUR. SOC’Y & POL. 543, 545-46
(2006).
131
See Meltem Müftüler-Baç & E. Fuat Keyman, Turkey Under the AKP: The Era of
Dominant-Party Politics, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2012, at 87.
132
See, e.g., Issacharoff, Democracies, supra note 6, at 1446-47 (arguing that
“[u]nder the circumstances, it is difficult to imagine a better outcome”); Özbudun,
supra note 130, at 548 (finding that the movement moderated through its successive
emanations and its platform is now “hardly distinguishable from a liberal or
conservative democratic party”).
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Development Party.133 This occurred not because of the ideology of the
party as much as because of its size relative to its competitors. The
party has at times resorted to questionable methods in order to achieve
its goals, for example, using legal proceedings to harass the
opposition.134 It has also utilized its largely-unilateral control over
constitutional reforms in a way that may have weakened the
democratic nature of the state; for example, by radically altering the
composition and powers of the Constitutional Court.135
The Turkish experience demonstrates the limits of party-banning in
dealing with situations where the main threat is the construction of a
competitive authoritarian regime via the means of abusive
constitutionalism. The strategy is unlikely to work well when dealing
with ideologically ambiguous political forces, rather than those that
are clearly anti-democratic. It is also unlikely to work well when
dealing with majoritarian rather than fringe political forces. These are
precisely the characteristics under which abusive constitutionalism
tends to occur, and under which competitive authoritarian regimes
form. Thus, party-banning and militant democracy have probably been
overstated as solutions to modern authoritarian threats.
B. Tiered Constitutional Amendment Thresholds
The remainder of this Part focuses on the design of the mechanisms
of constitutional change. Most countries have migrated towards a
baseline level of constitutional amendment that is relatively easy,
certainly far easier than in the United States. Indeed, the United States
amendment procedure under Article V is considered among the most
difficult in the world, requiring a two-thirds vote in both houses of
Congress as well as ratification by three-quarters of the state
legislatures.136 A developing literature suggests that a relatively low
133
See Ali Çarko lu, A New Electoral Victory for the ‘Pro-Islamists’ or the ‘New
Centre-Right’? The Justice and Development Party Phenomenon in the July 2007
Parliamentary Elections in Turkey, 12 S. EUR. SOC’Y & POL. 501, 516-17 (2007) (raising
the possibility that Turkey “is moving towards a dominant party system similar to
India, Japan or Italy before the 1990s”).
134
See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu, Arrest of Prosecutor in Turkey Exposes Tensions Between
Secular and Religious Turks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/ 02/21/world/europe/21turkey.html?_r=0 (detailing questionable arrests).
135
Turkish scholars debate whether the reforms to the Constitutional Court and
other tribunals packed it or simply constituted a liberalization and democratization of
the judiciary. See, e.g., Bâli, supra note 129, at 295-309 (summarizing the debate and
arguing that the reforms liberalized the Court’s composition and took away
authoritarian elements in its design).
136
See Adrian Vermeule, Second Opinions and Institutional Design, 97 VA. L. REV.
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(although not too low) amendment threshold has desirable effects.137
Empirical evidence finds that constitutions with an intermediate
difficulty of amendment tend to last longer than those with either very
easy or very difficult amendment thresholds.138 The hypothesis is that
extremely easy amendment mechanisms are associated with
constitutions that are considered meaningless by their own
populations, while very rigid constitutions are replaced because they
fail to adapt to the times.139 Based on this evidence, the U.S.
Constitution appears to have survived despite, rather than because of,
its very rigid amendment mechanisms. The U.S. Constitution has been
extensively amended through extra-constitutional means,140 but
scholars have uncovered relatively little evidence that these practices
translate into other contexts.141 It may be that the United States has
1435, 1438 (2011) (noting how difficult and time-consuming the U.S. amendment
process is); see also DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 170 tbl.5.7
(2006) (constructing an index showing that the United States has the second most
difficult amendment process out of a list of countries); Michael J. Klarman, What’s So
Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 184 (1998) (arguing that the
Article V process is so difficult to use as to make change practically impossible).
137
But see John Ferejohn & Lawrence Sager, Commitment and Constitutionalism, 81
TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1954-56 (2003) (noting that Article V “has become the
constitutional provision commentators love to hate” and defending the provision as
helping to maintain the core substantive commitments of the constitutional order).
138
See LUTZ, supra note 136, at 162 tbl.5.2; see also TOM GINSBURG ET AL., THE
ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 140 fig.6.4 (2009) (showing a U-shaped
relationship, and arguing that the ideal level of difficulty from the standpoint of
endurance is roughly the Indian amendment process, which requires a two-thirds
majority of Congress for most topics and, in addition, the approval of one-half of the
states for certain topics).
139
See LUTZ, supra note 136, at 156.
140
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991) (arguing that
major constitutional change in the United States has taken place in extraconstitutional ways rather than through the amendment process, as the Constitution
is remade in certain “constitutional moments” by combinations of the public, political
actors, and the courts); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459 (1994)
(arguing that Article V procedures were not intended to be the exclusive avenue of
constitutional reform, and presuppose a “background legal right of the people” to
“alter or abolish Government via the proper legal procedures”). But see Henry P.
Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 121, 121-22 (1996) (rejecting Amar’s argument based on an analysis of
the intent of the framers).
141
See, e.g., Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking in Comparative
Constitutional Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 193, 228-30 (2008) (arguing that the Quebec secession case represented a
case of extra-constitutional amendment by the Canadian Supreme Court, and calling
on scholars to identify other such cases).
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found a relatively unusual way of updating its Constitution that
cannot easily be replicated elsewhere. Most evidence, at any rate,
points towards making overall constitutional amendment relatively
easy compared to the United States.
Yet this design faces an obvious problem in that it would allow a
constitutional order to be distorted from within very easily — the
lower the amendment threshold, the more vulnerable a system would
be to abusive constitutional amendments. The stock solution in
modern constitutional theory is to use tiered amendment thresholds.
The concept is simply to protect some parts of the constitutional text
with heightened amendment requirements, making them more
difficult to alter.142 The most basic form of tiering uses heightened
supermajority requirements. For example, most parts of the South
African Constitution may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the
Parliament, but a set of foundational principles found in section I (as
well as the principles governing amendment itself) are more difficult
to change, and require the assent of seventy-five percent of
Parliament.143 In extreme cases, some provisions might be made
completely unamendable, as the Honduran Constitution has done
with respect to presidential re-election, and as the German
Constitution does with respect to certain core principles.144
Despite the growing importance of tiered constitutionalism, there is
still little scholarly work on both how to carry it out and what sorts of
provisions ought to be protected. Considering the practice through the
lens of abusive constitutionalism has implications for both points.
First, on the “how” question, some theorists suggest that including a
popular component to constitutional change (for example, by
requiring the public to ratify the results of whatever amendment has

142

See Richard Albert, Constitutional Handcuffs, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 709-10
(2010) [hereinafter Handcuffs] (advocating for such a system to protect certain
important provisions).
143
See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74. The regime is a bit more complex — Chapter
2 of the Constitution requires approval of two-thirds of the Parliament plus the assent
of the National Council of Provinces, with the agreement of at least six provinces. See
id. Any other provision may be amended with the assent of two-thirds of Parliament,
or a vote of the National Council of Provinces if the provision concerns their interests.
See id.
144
See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) art. 79, § 3 (“Amendments to this Basic
Law affecting the division of the Federation into Länder, their participation on
principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20
shall be inadmissible.”); CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS [CH] art. 374
(making certain constitutional provisions completely unamendable).
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passed the legislature) may increase the difficulty of amendment.145
Empirical studies offer mixed results on the question of whether or
not such requirements actually reduce the frequency of constitutional
amendment.146 But regardless of whether or not such requirements
decrease the frequency of amendment in the abstract, they seem
unlikely to do much to curb abusive constitutional practices. Powerful
political actors who are able to push their reforms through legislatures
seem likely to have the ability to gain the requisite degree of direct
popular support in most cases. Indeed, as the Chavez and Correa
examples show, powerful leaders often use the public as a way to
make an end-run around institutions when they cannot get what they
want out of these institutions.147 Adding tiers to the constitution by
adding referenda requirements or other forms of popular participation
seems unlikely to be productive.
In practice, the more common approach of adding higher
supermajority requirements for certain changes seems more likely to
be effective. But even relatively high supermajority requirements may
not adequately protect democracy against abusive constitutional
practices. The Hungarian example, in particular, shows that it may not
be that difficult for movements to temporarily receive very high
percentages of the vote.148
This suggests the utility of a third, still under-theorized and underutilized aspect to constructing constitutional tiers: a temporal
dimension.149 Time appears to be a particularly relevant dimension to
combating the problem of abusive constitutionalism, because it can
combat the ability of temporarily powerful political forces to entrench
themselves in power for the long haul. Yet few constitutional orders
utilize time effectively as a break on constitutional change. Some
systems do require multiple votes on a constitutional issue, but often

145

See, e.g., LUTZ, supra note 136, at 168 tbl.5.6 (constructing an index of difficulty
that adds significant points for constitutional amendment processes requiring popular
referenda).
146
See, e.g., John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of
Constitutions, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501, 523 (1997) (finding that popular
involvement via ratification adds little difficulty to amendment processes).
147
See supra Part I.C.
148
See supra Part I.D.
149
See Albert, Handcuffs, supra note 142, at 711 (noting and recommending a
regime of “sequential approval,” where citizens have to manifest their will to alter the
constitution in more than one vote, and that vote is separated by an interval of time);
Vermeule, supra note 136, at 1438 (noting one potential benefit of Article V
amendment procedures, which is that their slowness may induce “sober second
thoughts”).
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with no restriction or only a minimal restriction on interval.150 A far
better model, which is rarely found in practice, would require an
intervening election between efforts at constitutional change,
preferably of both the legislature and (in presidential systems) of the
executive.151 The intervening election requirement is helpful because it
reduces the possibility that incumbent politicians and parties can take
advantage of temporary spikes in their popularity to push through
amendments that are harmful to democracy. Thus, the ideal tiered
regime would seem to include temporal restrictions that require
multiple votes on amendments, with a long period of time (and ideally
an intervening election) between the votes. These temporal limitations
are probably the most important variable in terms of combatting
abusive constitutional practices, although they might be used along
with the far more common practice of increasing the voting
threshold.152
The more difficult problem is in determining which kinds of
provisions deserve to be placed on the higher amendment tier or tiers.
Here there has been virtually no theoretical work, and indeed scholars
seem to assume that the answers are highly specific to the individual
political culture at issue. We might call this an “expressivist” theory of
constitutional tiering, in which a state protects its most fundamental
values by giving them a special degree of entrenchment. A classic
example is Germany, where the Basic Law makes its most basic
150
As an example, the Colombian Constitution requires two separate votes on a
constitutional amendment, and requires that those votes be taken during separate
legislative sessions. The first vote requires a simple majority of Congress, while the
second requires an absolute majority. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.]
art. 375. Although this model technically requires two separate votes, these votes need
be separated by very little time — Congress can, and often does, take the first vote
towards the end of one legislative session, and take the other only a few days or weeks
later at the beginning of the next. Moreover, since each legislative session is only one
year, the requirement does not normally interpose a legislative or presidential election.
See generally James Melton, Constitutional Amendment Procedures: A Summary and
Critique of Existing Measures (June 18, 2012) (unpublished working paper) (on file
with author), available at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctqjm0/Files/melton_amendment.pdf
(commenting on the problems with measuring temporal limitations in the literature).
151
This model is used, for example, in Greece, which requires that amendments be
voted on by two different Parliaments via two different voting thresholds — fifty
percent in one vote and sixty percent in the other. See 1975 SYNTAGMA [SYN.]
[CONSTITUTION] 110 (Greece).
152
Empirically, there is no research on this question. Researchers have extensively
considered the relationship between different kinds of amendment regimes and the
amendment rate, but have had trouble measuring temporal limitations. See Melton,
supra note 150, at 28 (noting that temporal limitations are “trivialized by existing
measures of amendment difficulty”).
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principles, particularly “human dignity,” unamendable by any
means.153 South Africa takes a very similar tactic: it places basic values
such as “human dignity,” “non-racialism and non-sexism,” and
“universal adult suffrage” on the highest tier, which requires a threequarters rather than two-thirds majority of Parliament for
amendment.154
This approach to allocating tiers may play some role in helping to
define the basic values of the state by holding these values out for
special protection. But it is badly antiquated as a strategy for defending
democracy. It appears aimed at the same kind of totalitarian or
fundamentally anti-democratic threat as the party-banning clauses and
the militant democracy concept studied in section II(A).155 Modern
“competitive authoritarian” movements do not generally seek to
destroy the basic values of the constitutional order nor seek some
radically different vision for the shape of the state.156 They would not
be interested in altering fundamental constitutional principles such as
“human dignity,” so long as they could carry out enough institutional
alterations to perpetuate their own power.
Thus, an analysis of abusive constitutional practices suggests that
these are not the most important constitutional clauses to be
entrenching on a higher tier. We need more empirical research on
exactly how competitive authoritarian regimes work within
constitutional orders in order to have a fuller response to the question.
However, the expressivist approach to entrenchment seems aimed at
precisely the wrong things: competitive authoritarian regimes take
power by attacking the constitutional structure in subtle ways, rather
than by taking aim at either basic constitutional principles or rights.
Protecting the constitutional structure against abusive constitutional
practices is quite difficult. The most obvious and common provisions
are those entrenching term limits, which proved to be the flashpoint of
contention in the Honduran case.157 As the Hungarian case in
153

See GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) art. 79, § 3 (protecting the division of the
state into Länder and certain basic principles such as human dignity from ever being
amended).
154
See S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 74.
155
See supra Part II.A (considering the post-war German model of militant
democracy, which aims to eliminate anti-democratic threats from the democratic
order).
156
See supra Part I.E (noting that competitive authoritarian regimes gain power not
by proposing a radically different vision for the state, but by disabling opposition
parties and packing or disabling checking institutions).
157
See supra Part III.A (noting the entrenchment of presidential term limits in
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particular shows, abusive constitutional actors also may attack a range
of other provisions that bear on the central structural characteristics of
those checking institutions which are supposed to rein in the political
branches. Provisions bearing on the size, composition, and tenure of
high-ranking judges might be particularly valuable, and yet are
generally unprotected in existing constitutions. Similarly, they might
attack the tenure and selection mechanisms of other key mechanisms
of horizontal accountability such as ombudsmen and attorneys
general.
Crafting a set of tiered constitutional protections that would fully
protect the constitutional structure is likely to prove impossible. No
single provision is likely to prove decisive, since abusive
constitutionalists have many ways to achieve the same goal. For
example, an actor stymied in altering a key structural provision might
get a similar result by packing or undermining the court, a result that
could be achieved by altering the selection mechanism, reducing
jurisdiction, or in a host of other ways. In the absence of overarching
protection, would-be autocrats may be able to find alternative
provisions at both the constitutional and statutory level to achieve
identical ends, thus effectively working around tiered provisions.158
And, of course, the entire constitutional structure cannot be
subjected to higher-tiered protection because such an approach would
make the constitutional order entirely rigid, as opposed to just
selectively rigid and aimed at abusive constitutional threats. It would
block many innocuous changes as well as some dangerous ones. One
of the problems with abusive constitutionalism is precisely that the
same set of constitutional changes can be dangerous in one situation
and innocuous or beneficial in others. The Hungarian constitutional
changes, a kind of “Frankenstate” cobbled together from a set of
common constitutional provisions and legal rules found in many wellfunctioning constitutional orders, are a case in point. The tiering
mechanism is not discriminating enough to separate out the
dangerous constitutional changes from the innocuous ones. The stock
answer to the deficiencies of constitutional tiering is the
unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine, which is the
focus of the next section.
Honduras).
158
As an example, consider the Hungarian case in Part I.D — the Fidesz party
utilized a variety of alternative means to undermine the Constitutional Court and the
judiciary, including packing the court, stripping part of its jurisdiction, and lowering
the retirement age for judges. Some of these changes required constitutional alteration
or replacement, but others required mere statutory changes.
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C. The Unconstitutional-Constitutional Amendments Doctrine
A series of countries have developed the so-called “unconstitutionalconstitutional amendment doctrine,” which holds that a constitutional
amendment can itself be substantively unconstitutional under certain
conditions. The doctrine has been espoused by courts such as the
German, Indian, Turkish, and Colombian Constitutional Courts. In
Colombia, as noted above, the Court recently used the doctrine to
prevent President Alvaro Uribe Velez from amending the Constitution
to run for a third consecutive term in office.159 The Court held that the
proposed amendment would constitute a “substitution of the
constitution,” rather than an amendment, because it fundamentally
changed the separation of powers in the country.160 The Turkish
Constitutional Court struck down an amendment allowing Islamic
headscarves to be worn in universities; the Court held that this
amendment was contrary to the secular constitutional order.161 Finally,
in an example closer to home, the California Supreme Court discussed
the doctrine in the context of Proposition 8, which banned gay
marriage in the state.162 The proponents argued that the amendment
159

See supra Part I.B.
See supra text accompanying notes 35–43.
161
A woman denied the ability to wear a headscarf then took her case to the
European Court of Human Rights, which ruled that her right to religious freedom had
not been infringed. See Leyla ahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 122-23, ECHR
2005; see also Cindy Skach, International Decision, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 186, 195 (2006)
(arguing that the case illustrates a complex interrelationship between domestic and
international law on this issue). The case lies somewhere between the non-textual
unconstitutional-constitutional amendments doctrine constructed by the Indian and
Colombian Courts and the tiering practice noted above. The Turkish constitution
does make some provisions unamendable, and this includes the provision prohibiting
amendments to Article 2, which lays out the “basic characteristics” of the state and
defines Turkey as being “a democratic, secular and social State.” See Yaniv Roznai &
Serkan Yolcu, An Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment — The Turkish
Perspective: A Comment on the Turkish Constitutional Court’s Headscarf Decision, 10
INT’L J. CONST. L. 175, 194 (2012). But the court interpreted this doctrine to allow it to
strike down constitutional amendments found elsewhere in the Constitution that
infringe on the secular principle, which makes its usage very similar to the nontextual, common-law like usage of the Indian and Colombian Courts.
162
See Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 444 (2009) (finding that the Proposition
does not constitute a constitutional revision because it does not undertake “far
reaching change in the fundamental governmental structure or the foundational
power of its branches as set forth in the Constitution”). Strauss is in fact part of a long
line of California cases interpreting the amendment/revision distinction. See, e.g.,
Prof’l Eng’rs in Cal. Gov’t v. Kempton, 40 Cal. 4th 1016, 1046-47 (2007) (concluding
that a constitutional change dealing with the contracting of architectural and
engineering services is not a revision); Legislature v. EU, 54 Cal. 3d 492 (1991)
160
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constituted not an amendment, but rather a revision, which required a
more stringent process under the California Constitution than mere
majority approval by referendum.163 The Court, after an extensive
discussion of the history of the distinction and relevant doctrine,
found that the change was an amendment and thus that the method
used was proper.164 The doctrine of unconstitutional-constitutional
amendments has thus passed from the fringe of constitutional theory
towards its center.
But the doctrine has also been subjected to an avalanche of scholarly
criticism.165 The crux of the critique is easy to make out: the doctrine
seems to be “the most extreme of counter-majoritarian acts.”166 In
other words, while ordinary judicial review overrides political action,
the judicial decision might in turn be overridden by constitutional
amendment.167 In countries where constitutional amendment is
(holding that a proposition which adopted legislative term limits, limited spending on
legislative staff, and restricted state retirement benefits was not a revision); Raven v.
Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 349-55 (1990) (finding that a sweeping set of reforms to
criminal procedure rules under the state constitution, intended to overturn numerous
pro-defendant rulings of the California State Supreme Court, did indeed constitute a
revision and thus was invalidated).
163
An amendment may be proposed either by a two-thirds vote of the legislature,
or by petition of eight percent of voters. In either case, the amendment is approved
with the consent of a majority of voters. A revision is proposed by either a two-thirds
vote of the legislature or a Constituent Assembly (which itself must be called by a
two-thirds vote of the legislature followed by majority approval of the electorate). See
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8; id. art. XVIII, §§ 1–4.
164
See Strauss, 46 Cal. 4th at 444.
165
See, e.g., Richard Albert, Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J.L. & JUR. 5,
22-23 (2009) [hereinafter Amendments] (calling the basic structure doctrine “curious,”
although suggesting some possible lines of defense); Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism
and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L.
495, 501 n.34 (1989) (stating that basic structure doctrine “remains a highly
problematic and controversial element of Indian constitutional law”); Andrew B.
Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1025, 1069-70 (2010) (declaring that Indian basic structure doctrine “lack[s] any
basis in original understanding”); Gary J. Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution?
A Comparative Perspective, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 460, 487 (2006) (commenting that “if
ever confronted with the felt need to exercise this option, sober heads might well
wonder whether it was any longer worth doing”); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning A
Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 58 n.268 (2003) (referring to the basic
structure doctrine as an “extreme example of judicial activism”).
166
Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV.
1763, 1799 (2004) (nonetheless suggesting possible justifications for the doctrine).
167
See Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the
Constitutional Imagination, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1477-80 (2009) (arguing that foreign
countries adopted easier amendment thresholds and other mechanisms partly because
of unrestrained fear of judicial power as expressed through Lochner).
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relatively easy (unlike in the United States), this is a real check on the
power of judicial review. But the unconstitutional-constitutional
amendments doctrine takes away this safety valve by allowing courts
to strike down even constitutional amendments. Such an approach
faces “obvious” problems from the standpoint of democratic theory.168
A focus on the practice of abusive constitutionalism suggests a
justification for the doctrine, and an advantage over the use of
constitutional tiers in the text. First, most constitutional orders are not
well-crafted to deal with the modern dangers to democracy — they
either fail to include tiered provisions at all or they tier the wrong
kinds of things such as expressivist provisions, as the South African
example shows.169 Second, even an ideally-crafted constitution, with
appropriate tiered provisions protecting key structural provisions,
would not fully prevent the problem of abusive constitutionalism.
Only certain limited parts of the constitution can be tiered; any
alternative design would lose many of the benefits of constitutional
flexibility. And would-be autocrats are experts in figuring out
alternative ways to achieve the same ends. The Hungarian example
illustrates the point with respect to the constitutional judiciary: rather
than replacing the Constitutional Court or changing its tenure rules,
the Fidesz simply added more positions to the Court, and therefore is
moving towards “packing” it.170
As Issacharoff has pointed out, the doctrine of unconstitutionalconstitutional amendments makes sense in such a world precisely
because of its flexibility — it allows judges to defend the
constitutional order without being constrained by the limits of
constitutional text.171 The core concerns of abusive constitutionalism
are useful as a potential anchor, helping to make its usage more
precise and justifiable. The claim is not that abusive constitutionalism
necessarily offers the sole justification for the doctrine’s use.172 My
168
Rosalind Dixon, Transnational Constitutionalism and Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendments (May 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1840963.
169
See supra text accompanying notes 153–154.
170
See supra Part I.D.
171
See Samuel Issacharoff, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Hedging, 99 GEO.
L.J. 961, 1002 (2011) [hereinafter Courts] (noting that the basic structure approach
may be valuable because it may not be “apparent from the outset of a democracy
which provisions may prove to be central,” and that ex ante exposition of the
provisions may be impossible).
172
In contrast, uses in other areas often seem more problematic. For example, both
the Turkish and Indian Courts have suggested that “secularism” may be a basic part of
their respective constitutional orders. In Turkey, the Constitutional Court in 2005
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claim instead is more modest — it is particularly well-suited and welljustified by these practices. Thus, focusing on these practices helps to
resolve an important conceptual problem: it clarifies the kinds of
situations where the notoriously vague doctrine ought to be
invoked.173
This perspective comports with that of other scholars who have
suggested a “pragmatic” defense of the doctrine. Thus Issacharoff
argues that the judicial construction of immutable principles in new
democracies may help to prevent them from eroding from within by
“protect[ing] the core features of contested democratic governance.”174
Similarly, Bernal tracks the use of the doctrine in the Colombian
experience, and argues that it plays a valuable function in hyperpresidentalist regimes.175 Using the Uribe case as an example, he notes
that strong presidents can exercise disproportionate influence over
these systems, co-opting amendment processes to serve their own
struck down a constitutional amendment allowing headscarves to be worn in
universities because it struck down basic principles of secularism found in the
constitutional order. This decision was upheld by the European Court of Human
Rights. See Leyla ahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 114-115, ECHR 2005. The
main question here, as recognized by the European Court, is whether secularism is
necessary for maintaining a democratic order in Turkey. See id. This conclusion seems
problematic in light of both a broader literature on constitutionalism and in light of
subsequent experience in Turkey itself — both suggest that democratic
constitutionalism is robust to some religious involvement. See, e.g., Roznai & Yolcu,
supra note 161, at 204 (arguing, inter alia, that allowing students to wear headscarves
would not contravene the constitutional secularism principle). In India, secularism
crops up in a different context, as a way to tamp down on religious tensions that
might unravel the multi-ethnic state and allow majoritarian religious groups to attack
minority religions groups. The use might seem more justifiable in this kind of context,
but it might also be redundant. Given the thickness of work on constitutional design
in multiethnic democracies, designers now have a range of tools in representative
bodies and elsewhere for dealing with these kinds of threats. See generally DONALD L.
HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT (2d ed. 2000) (considering the problem);
AREND LIJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977)
(same). It is perhaps telling that the Indian Supreme Court has used the secularist
“basic structure” principle not as a way to strike down constitutional amendments,
but rather as a way to justify declarations of emergency by the central government
against ultra-religious groups. See S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 644
(upholding emergency measures replacing ultra-Hindu governors who encouraged
religiously-based measures against Islamic sites, on the grounds that the actions were
necessary to preserve secularism).
173
Of course, this does not eliminate the need for difficult judicial judgments on
when a given constitutional change truly threatens the democratic order, which is a
topic for future work.
174
Issacharoff, Courts, supra note 171, at 1002.
175
See, e.g., Bernal-Pulido, supra note 36 (justifying the constitutional replacement
doctrine in hyper-presidential regimes on conceptual and normative arguments).
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interests and thus permanently reducing the quality of the democracy.
This is particularly true in systems, like the Colombian, where
constitutional amendment is relatively easy.176
This justification also helps explain the doctrine’s notorious
vagueness; judges and commentators often have difficulty in linking
successful use of the doctrine either to individual textual provisions or
to clear structural principles.177 The reason is because the doctrine is
being aimed at a moving target — it is protecting democracy from
substantial movement along the spectrum towards authoritarianism,
rather than at protecting any single constitutional principle in
isolation.
For example, the Indian Supreme Court’s most aggressive uses of
the doctrine came in three key decisions that all dealt with the same
underlying event — the events surrounding the “emergency” declared
by Indira Gandhi, where she effectively suspended both elections and
many civil liberties for two years.178 The measures enacted by Gandhi
that were struck down under the doctrine primarily comprised
attempts to insulate certain core matters such as expropriation claims,
nationalizations, electoral disputes, and the constitutional amendment
power itself from judicial control.179 The resonance between the kinds
of measures enacted by Gandhi and modern competitive authoritarian
projects is striking: she took measures both to disable electoral
opposition (fraud, harassment, etc.) and to weaken key checking
institutions, including the Supreme Court. The decisions taken by the
Court in those years were justified less by a search for basic structural
176
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] arts. 374-78 (explaining the
different processes for constitutional amendment, which require only a simple
majority legislative approval in the first round and an absolute majority in the
second).
177
See Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2299 (India) (expressing
broad disagreement within the judicial opinions about exactly what principles of the
basic structure a particular constitutional amendment violated); see also Albert,
Amendments, supra note 165, at 23 (noting that “the contours of the basic structure
doctrine remain unsettled”).
178
See generally Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial Power: The Basic Structure
Doctrine and Public Interest Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L
L.J. 175, 183-88 (2010) (detailing the emergency in the context of the relevant
caselaw).
179
See Minerva Mills v. Union of India, (1980) 4 S.C.C. 222 (amendments
insulating nationalization and constitutional amendments from judicial review);
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain, (1975) 2 S.C.C. 159 (amendments insulating
elections from judicial review); Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973
S.C. 1461 (amendments insulating expropriation from judicial review); see also SUDHIR
KRISHNASWAMY, DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: A STUDY OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE
DOCTRINE 43-69 (2009).
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principles, on which the Court consistently fragmented, than by a
consensus that Gandhi’s actions, taken as a whole, were a substantial
threat to the democratic order.180 These decisions only chipped away
at Gandhi’s program, but they may have called public attention to her
undermining of the democratic order.181
Similarly, the Colombian Constitutional Court struggled to
articulate a criteria in order to distinguish a constitutional amendment
allowing two consecutive presidential terms (which was upheld) and
amending it to allow three consecutive terms (which was struck
down). Again, however, the persuasiveness of the Court’s inquiry
depended on its concrete assessment of the impact on the Colombian
political system. A third term would have given Uribe the power to
appoint nearly all of the officials who were supposed to be checking
him. Perhaps more importantly, it would have given him informal
control, through patronage and other means, over nearly every aspect
of the state, and would have made him nearly impossible to
dislodge.182 The Court’s decision aimed at identifying a constitutional
change that would have implied a substantial movement along the
spectrum towards authoritarianism.
Finally, the fact that the doctrine may be used to protect basic
principles of the democratic order may help to alleviate or at least
problematize concerns about it being the ultimate undemocratic or
counter-majoritarian act that a court can carry out. First, as noted in
detail in Part I, constitutional amendment processes can easily be used
to carry out the agendas of particular actors or political groups; they
do not necessarily represent the will of the “people” in an
uncontestable sense.183 Second, the examples of Hungary, Venezuela,
180
For an example, see Shri Raj Narain, 2 S.C.C. at 412 where the four justices
voting that the electoral amendment at issue violated the basic structure doctrine did
so using three different theories: democracy, equality, and structural encroachment on
judicial power.
181
See Raju Ramachandran, The Supreme Court and the Basic Structure Doctrine, in
SUPREME BUT NOT INFALLIBLE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 107,
120 (B.N. Kirpal et al. eds., 2000).
182
See supra text accompanying notes 36–43.
183
See supra Part I. I do not of course seek to adopt any single definition of the
“people” for this purpose, nor do I take a position on whether such a definition is
possible. As others have noted, this is an extraordinarily difficult practical
undertaking, especially but not exclusively in multi-ethnic polities. See, e.g., Richard
S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 738-43 (2011) (noting problems
that arise in determining whether a population is sufficiently coherent to be
considered one people). I merely argue that the use of the popular will by leaders such
as Chavez, Correa, and the Fidesz was problematic, and that they effectively wielded a
contestable claim into sweeping constitutional transformation.
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Colombia, and Ecuador all show that mechanisms of constitutional
change may often be used to damage the democratic order over the
long term, making it more difficult to dislodge incumbents or to hold
them accountable.184 The use of the doctrine of unconstitutionalconstitutional amendments may merely be a way to protect democracy
over the longer term from certain extreme exercises of political power
that threaten the institutional order itself. This suggests a type of
process-based defense: One common justification for judicial review is
that courts have the power to take counter-majoritarian actions to
protect democratic channels themselves, and in an extreme form this
may describe the proper use of the doctrine of unconstitutionalconstitutional amendments.185
Still, this justification for the doctrine raises important problems,
which tend to undermine its effectiveness in practice. First, there is
some evidence that the doctrine has tended to expand through time, as
courts find more and more parts of the constitution to be “basic.” In
other words, there may be substantial risks that the doctrine tends to
be over-inclusive. In some contexts, the identification of the parts of
the constitutional order that are basic seems to jive surprisingly well
with the constitutional court’s own jurisprudence, suggesting that the
doctrine is sometimes used for turf-protection.186 For example, the
Colombian Court recently suggested that a legislative attempt to
recriminalize drug possession following a judicial decision
decriminalizing it would likely constitute a substitution of the
constitution because it would partially replace core values like human
dignity and autonomy.187 In another recent decision, the Court struck
down a constitutional amendment intended to evade its decisions
requiring the civil service regime to be applied retroactively to
incumbent office-holders.188 It held that the amendment infringed core
184

See supra Part I.
Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181-82 (1980) (arguing for a
process-based defense of United States constitutional law, called “representation
reinforcement,” as a way to combat the counter-majoritarian difficulty).
186
Consider also the recent cases in India where the Court has used the basic
structure doctrine to limit efforts to set up a parallel system of administrative courts
separate from the ordinary judiciary and more dependent on the government. See
Ramachandran, supra note 181, at 122-23 (listing cases). It is true that this sort of
action could be used as part of a plan of abusive constitutionalism, but in the context
where the relevant provisions were struck down, there was no such threat.
187
See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Julio 22, 2011,
Sentencia C-574/11, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at
http://corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2011/c-574-11.htm.
188
See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Agosto 27, 2009,
Sentencia C-588/09, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available at
185
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constitutional principles protecting “meritocracy.” Even for defenders
of the doctrine, this expansive dynamic is disturbing. It amplifies the
democratic concerns associated with the doctrine, and by making the
constitution unduly rigid it may push politicians towards more
disruptive mechanisms of change, especially wholesale constitutional
replacement.
More importantly, there are reasons to think that the doctrine will
prove to be fairly under-inclusive. It not only will tend to be used
where it does not need to be used, but it will also fail where it most
needs to be used. As the Colombian, Venezuelan, and Hungarian
examples showed, these cases require courts to undertake decisions to
stop highly popular and powerful actors in cases that touch their core
interests and during periods of institutional and constitutional stress.
The examples above show that courts were able to play a significant
role in each case, but with varying results. Colombia remains the
major positive example, where a court decision is credited with
helping to save democracy in the country.189 In Hungary, in contrast,
the Constitutional Court has played a much more ambiguous role,
blocking some individual measures but declining to deploy the basic
structure doctrine in the face of significant political pressure.190
Moreover, as the Fidesz continues to control the political levers in the
country, it has moved towards gaining effective control over the
Court. In the long run, then, the Court is unlikely to prove an effective
check on the Fidesz.
There are reasons to think that the Colombian example is
exceptional. As commentators have pointed out, political actors may
pay a high price both internationally and domestically for flatly
disobeying judicial decisions.191 Decisions can still be ignored, and
hostile courts shut down, but it may be more difficult for politicians to
take these steps than it once was.192 In that sense, courts are more
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2009/C-588-09.htm.
189
See supra Part I.B.
190
See supra text accompanying notes 72–73.
191
See, e.g., Issacharoff, Courts, supra note 171, at 1010-11 (arguing that court
decisions do have bite in many difficult institutional contexts, although admitting that
courts sometimes fail to carry out this role or are ignored by other institutions).
192
Still, there are several well-known examples of these practices. In Belarus, the
competitive authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko ignored constitutional
court rulings holding that he had violated the Constitution sixteen times during his
first two years in office. See LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 25, at 79. In Russia, in
perhaps the best known example of judicial inefficacy, President Yeltsin closed down a
recalcitrant Constitutional Court after it held unconstitutional several of his decrees
relating to the constitutional process. See Epstein et al., supra note 96, at 136-37.
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relevant during episodes of abusive constitutionalism than they were
during classic military coups. The easier way for a hybrid or
competitive authoritarian regime to control a court is to pack it —
packing a court is relatively quiet, and a pocket court is highly
unlikely to deploy tools like the basic structure doctrine against its
own regime. Any competitive authoritarian regime that is linked to a
durable political movement — as was the case in Venezuela, and is
now the case in Hungary — is likely to succeed in packing its
Constitutional Court once given enough time.193
D. The Theoretical Gap of Constitutional Replacement
A final problem with the unconstitutional-constitutional
amendment doctrine is that it rests on problematic theoretical
foundations that leave constitutional replacement (as opposed to
constitutional amendment) unprotected against abusive constitutional
practices. These foundations assume that only constitutional
amendment — and not constitutional replacement — raise risks of
abuse. Yet as shown in Part I, both constitutional amendment and
constitutional replacement raise these risks.
Faced with the anti-majoritarian critique of the unconstitutionalconstitutional amendments doctrine noted above, scholars have
developed an essentially process-based defense of the doctrine. Vicki
Jackson, for example, has recently argued that the doctrine might be
strengthened if it is viewed not as cutting off all avenues for
democratic override, but instead as simply asserting that one
particular method of popular change — constitutional amendment —
is unavailable, and that democratic figures must proceed by using
some other, more demanding procedure.194 She calls this form of
review “substantive procedural” review.195 In some cases, this defense
of the doctrine is easy to spot, as in California. As many state
constitutions did at one time, the California Constitution distinguishes
193
In Venezuela, for example, the judiciary played some role in checking Chavez
early on in his presidency, but has lost its remaining independence through time. See
Raul A. Sanchez Urribarri, Courts Between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism:
Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 854, 854 (2011).
194
See Vicki Jackson, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: A Window into
Constitutional Theory and Transnational Constitutionalism, in DEMOKRATIEPERSPEKTIVEN: FESTSCHRIFT FUR BRUN-OTTO BRYDE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 47, 60-62
(Michael Bauerle et al. eds., 2013) (“Tiered amendment procedures enforced through
substantive procedural review has the effect of making some provisions harder, but
not impossible, to amend, thereby ensuring constitutional justice commitments to
retain their democratic or consensual rooting.”).
195
See id. at 60.
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between “amendment” and “revision,” and requires revisions to go
through more demanding procedures.196 By telling the political
branches that they cannot change the constitution via amendment, the
California Supreme Court is in essence requiring constitutional
change via the more exacting method of revision.
Most foreign constitutions do not have such an explicit two-tiered
procedure for constitutional change, but it is possible to infer one if
we assume that replacing the constitution is the alternative to
amending it. In this way, the doctrine may again be understood as a
safeguard of the constituent power of the people. The theory helps to
bolster the democratic legitimacy of the doctrine by suggesting that
courts applying it are merely acting as gatekeepers to shunt different
kinds of change through the correct pathway, rather than altogether
stopping democratic debate on a given issue. Certain changes require
the higher-level deliberation implied by constitutional replacement,
rather than ordinary constitutional amendment procedures.
Such a position aligns with Bruce Ackerman’s two-track theory of
constitutionalism in the United States. Ackerman argues that in most
cases in American history, the constituted political branches acted
under the rules of an existing political order, but in a few key
instances (most notably after the Civil War and during the New Deal)
political figures gained such enduring and deep support that they
effectively acted in the name of the people to remake the
Constitution.197 The process-based defenses of the unconstitutionalconstitutional amendment doctrine suggest a similar distinction
between the ordinary constituted powers (which possess only a
limited constitutional amendment power) and the “people” (who
possess a plenary power to remake the constitutional order).
This also appears to be how the doctrine is understood in many of
the systems that regularly use it. For example, the Indian Supreme
Court has held that the basic structure doctrine is a limitation on
article 368 — which governs Parliament’s power to amend the
Constitution — and so presumably not on the power of a Constituent
Assembly or other entity to replace the Constitution.198 More
explicitly, the Colombian Constitutional Court has held that the
“substitution of the Constitution doctrine” limits constitutional
196

See supra text accompanying note 163.
See ACKERMAN, supra note 140, at 6-7 (1991) (“[A] dualist constitution seeks to
distinguish between two different decisions that may be made in a democracy. The
first is a decision by the American people; the second, by their government.”)
198
See KRISHNASWAMY, supra note 179, at 30 (noting that the Kesavananda court
made an important distinction between amendment and replacement).
197
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amendment by Parliament or via referendum, but not constitutional
replacement by Constituent Assembly.199 According to the Colombian
Court, only the people acting through a constituent assembly can
exercise the “original constituent power” necessary to make certain
fundamental changes to the constitutional order.200
The theoretical defense of the unconstitutional-constitutional
amendments doctrine therefore assumes a complete distinction
between constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement. It
assumes that only amendment is subject to abusive constitutional
practices, while constitutional replacement is always carried out by the
people themselves. These arguments have had a significant impact on
comparative constitutional theory and practice. In academic work, it
links back to the classical conception of constitution-making views as
a legally uncontrolled and uncontrollable act.201 Traditional theorists
Emmanuel Joseph Sieyes and Carl Schmitt envision constitutionmaking as an act carried out by a power that is of necessity superior to
any existing political force.202 This has become known as the theory of
“original constituent power.” Sieyes for example writes that the
national will is not subject to a constitution, while Schmitt argues that
constitutions are created by acts of political will and that this will
coexists even once constitutions have been drafted. Both theorists
suggest a vision of what Joel Colon-Rios has called “weak
constitutionalism” — the idea that the people have the inherent power
to remake their constitutional order at any time, unconstrained by the
existing political order.203 Many scholars, including Bruce Ackerman,
have expressed dissatisfaction with the Sieyes/Schmitt view of

199

See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Octubre 19, 2005,
Sentencia C-1040/05, Gaceta de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (Colom.), available
at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2005/C-1040-05.htm.
200
The Colombian Constitution explicitly contemplates constitutional amendment
or replacement by Constituent Assembly. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA
[C.P.] art. 376.
201
See Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, at 932.
202
See CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 125-26 (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2008);
EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? 17 (1963). I do not mean to
imply that these two theories are identical; some important differences are discussed
in JOEL COLON RIOS, WEAK CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE
QUESTION OF CONSTITUENT POWER 88 (2012).
203
See RIOS, supra note 202, at 1-2; see also Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the
Constitution-Making Process, 45 DUKE L.J. 364, 394-96 (1995) (arguing that
constitution-making via popular devices like constituent assemblies will produce a
better product and allow for more deliberation in the polity).
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constitution-making, but none have really offered a mechanism for
restraining abusive constitutional replacement.204
The Sieyes/Schmitt vision has also left important imprints at the
level of both doctrine and constitutional design.205 The doctrine of
original constituent power holds that the people retain their inherent
right to step outside the existing constitutional order and to replace
the constitutional text at any time. The constitutional order constrains
the “constituted powers” set up by the text, but cannot constrain the
“people” from remaking their constitutional order. At the level of
constitutional design, relatively few constitutions contain any clause
to regulate their own replacement, since replacement is seen as an act
that takes place outside the constitutional order. Moreover, exercises
of “original constituent power” are seen as associated with the popular
will, and therefore devices like constituent assemblies and referenda
are normally thought to be consistent with the doctrine. Thus, when
constitutional replacement is regulated in constitutional texts, it is
generally activated through the use of these devices, and can be
regulated through popular mechanisms that are either less demanding
or arguably no more demanding than those needed to amend the
constitution.206
204
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS 11 (1998)
(carefully distinguishing the theory of original constituent power from his theory of
American constitutional transformation, and asserting that the former is the point
where “law ends, and pure politics (or war) begins”); Andrew Arato, Forms of
Constitution-Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 191, 230-31
(1995) (rejecting a “sovereign” model of constitution-making as overly majoritarian
and as not allowing for sequential learning). Arato has a highly-developed model of
“post-sovereign” constitution-making that relies on roundtable discussions and
external constraints by courts or other bodies. See ANDREW ARATO, CONSTITUTION
MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION 59-98 (2000). But this cooperation in his theory emerges
endogenously and is not a product of provisions in the existing constitutional text,
perhaps because he focuses on transitions from authoritarian regimes rather than
constitution-making within already-democratic regimes.
205
Rios and Hutchinson argue that references to “constituent power” have largely
disappeared from American constitutional theory. See Joel Colon-Rios and Allen
Hutchinson, Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship?, 89 DENV. U. L. REV.
593, 597 (2012). The assertion is more questionable both on the level of foreign
constitutional theory and comparative constitutional practice by courts and
politicians, where the doctrine remains popular. For some examples of the use of the
“original constituent power” doctrine from Latin America, see Landau, ConstitutionMaking, supra note 1, at 965-66.
206
A striking example of this sort of vague, populist constitution-making language
occurs in Germany, where the Basic Law was explicitly thought to be a temporary text
to be replaced upon unification. The relevant clause states: “This Basic Law, which
since the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany applies to the entire
German people, shall cease to apply on the day on which a constitution freely adopted
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The problem is that constitutional replacement is also part of the
toolkit of abusive constitutional regimes — by controlling the
processes that trigger replacement or the process of constitutionmaking itself, powerful figures and movements can reshape the
constitutional order efficiently in a way that suits their interests. The
examples drawn from Venezuela, Ecuador, and Hungary show that
constitutional amendment and constitutional replacement are viewed
by would-be authoritarian actors as complementary mechanisms.
Indeed, the two tools are often deployed by political figures either as
substitutes or as part of a common package used to entrench
individuals or groups in power. The Ecuadorian and Venezuelan cases
demonstrate the former pattern, where Chavez and Correa turned
towards constitutional replacement because they would have had
difficulty forcing amendment through accepted channels.207 The
Hungarian case demonstrates the latter pattern — the Fidesz took
sufficient control of Parliament to both reform and replace the
Constitution, and used both powers strategically to entrench its own
power and to neutralize opposition to its project.208
Constitutional replacement, then, remains largely unregulated in
constitutional theory and practice, and this makes it liable to abuse by
powerful actors or groups purporting to act in the name of the people.
The failure to regulate processes of constitutional replacement is a
significant gap in modern constitutional theory. It might be valuable
for constitutional texts to regulate two different types of issues: the
conditions under which the existing constitution may be replaced, and
the process for making a new constitution.209 This kind of
by the German people takes effect.” GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) art.
146. This provision forms a startling gap in a constitutional order that otherwise
protects itself against abusive constitutional change, both through “militant
democracy” and unamendable provisions. See Kay, supra note 183, at 726-27; see also
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 376 (Colom.) (allowing a Constituent
Assembly, with undefined procedures and characteristics, to be called by a majority
vote in Congress, followed by approval in a referendum); CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA
REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA, arts. 348-349 (Ven.) (allowing a Constituent
Assembly replacing the Constitution to be called by either the President, two-thirds of
Congress, two-thirds of local governments, or fifteen percent of voters).
207
See supra Part I.C.
208
See supra Part I.D.
209
An alternative to textual replacement clauses would be a judge-made
unconstitutional-constitutional replacement doctrine — in other words, an
assumption that the new constitutional text is bound by certain fundamental
principles of the existing constitutional order, and that judges are charged with
policing those limits. This is conceptually possible: the South African interim
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constitutional replacement provision does not exist anywhere,
although elements of it are present in various constitutional designs.210
Note that my argument here does not wade into the complex
jurisprudential debate about whether existing constitutions can as a
theoretical matter control new constitution-making efforts, or whether
those efforts jurisprudentially stand outside of the existing order. The
point instead is a pragmatic one: these clauses might have sociological
and psychological effects on the expectations of citizens, altering
practices in useful ways by lessening the probability of a destructive
rupture.
Thresholds for triggering constitutional replacement might be made
considerably higher than those for ordinary constitutional amendment
and not, as in Hungary, equal to or less stringent than the amendment
threshold.211 This follows from the fact that replacement is ordinarily
more destructive of the constitutional order. And if replacement
mechanisms are meant to be popular end-runs around existing
institutions, then they should be difficult both to activate and to pass.
For example, a replacement mechanism via referendum might require
ten percent of registered voters to be placed on the ballot, and perhaps
seventy-five percent of registered voters to be successful. This is also
another area where temporal restrictions might be useful: voters
could, for example, be required to vote twice in favor of authorizing a
constituent assembly, with a gap of at least one intervening election
separating the two votes.212 As in the constitutional amendment
context, the use of time would be helpful to guard against
constitution for example contained fundamental principles that had to be adhered to
in the final constitutional text, and those principles were enforced by the
Constitutional Court. See, e.g., Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making and
its Pathology in Iraq, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 539 (2006) [hereinafter Pathology in
Iraq] (outlining the South Africa two-stage model). The South African case was
extraordinary in that the principles were textual rather than judge-made. A wholly
judge-made doctrine would face severe problems from both the standpoints of
democratic theory and practical enforceability. In Venezuela, for example, the
Supreme Court’s attempts to make the constitution-making process comply with the
“spirit” of the existing constitution proved ineffective. See supra text accompanying
notes 50-54. Moreover, unlike an unconstitutional-constitutional amendments
doctrine, an unconstitutional-constitutional replacement doctrine truly would seem to
take away any mechanism through which a polity could carry out certain fundamental
changes to the constitutional order.
210
See infra note 211.
211
See supra note 74 (noting that the amendment and replacement thresholds were
identical in Hungary because the country never passed a permanent constitution after
the democratic transition).
212
See supra text accompanying notes 149-150 (exploring the utility of temporal
limitations in the constitutional amendment process).
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constitutional replacement that is carried out merely to serve the
interests of particular political actors or groups.
Further, these replacement clauses could regulate the constitutionmaking process itself. Constitutions could, for example, impose supermajoritarian requirements for the votes of any constitutional assembly
that might be called under such a provision, and might also regulate
the electoral rules that would be used to choose such an Assembly.213
These requirements are important because they would ensure that the
constitution-making process could not be hijacked for majoritarian
ends. A number of scholars have argued that majoritarian models of
constitution-making tend to lead to poor results, and that models
should instead seek to encourage consensus.214
There is, of course, some risk that these clauses might be ignored.
Constitutional replacement tends to occur at moments of political
crisis in a polity, and at those moments legal restraints on power tend
to be inoperative. Courts attempting to enforce restraints in those
environments may reach the limits of their “zones of tolerance,” and
either be ignored or shut down for issuing hostile decisions.215 But as
already noted, political actors seeking to create hybrid regimes will
likely be wary of disobeying clear constitutional texts; such actions
213
The new Bolivian Constitution of 2009 has a replacement clause that does a
poor job of regulating the initiation of constitution-making, but is unusual in
attempting to regulate the constitution-making process along the lines suggested here.
The clause provides that an “original full-powered Constituent Assembly” may be
initiated by twenty percent of the electorate, an absolute majority of the Legislative
Assembly, or the President, and the proposal must be approved by referendum.
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO (CONST. BOL.) (2009), art. 411 (Bol.). This
structure, like that of Ecuador and Venezuela, is subject to populist manipulation by a
strong president. See supra note 204. However, the Bolivian Constitution also provides
that decisions of the Assembly must be taken by two-thirds majority, and then
approved in referendum. See CONST. BOL. (2009), art. 411. This kind of provision at
least gestures towards an effective regulation of the constitution-making process,
although it leaves key questions unanswered (such as the electoral rules used to select
an Assembly). A similar clause was in place when the 2009 Constitution was written,
and it may have helped to constrain an extremely messy process somewhat, producing
a consensus Constitution. See Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1, at 956-57
(noting that the rules were threatened at various points but ultimately followed).
214
See, e.g., Arato, Pathology in Iraq, supra note 209, at 538-49 (arguing for a postsovereign model of constitution-making); Landau, Constitution-Making, supra note 1,
at 934-38 (arguing for a model of constitutionalism that focuses on worst-case
outcomes — breakdowns of order or slides of democracy into competitive
authoritarian regimes); Partlett, supra note 89, at 237-38 (arguing that the Russian
experience shows the dangers of an unrestrained constitution-making process).
215
See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 96 (noting that the Russian Constitutional
Court, attempting to constrain Yeltsin during the Russian constitution-making
process, reached the limit of its zone of tolerance and was shut down).
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would risk falling afoul of the democracy clauses examined earlier and
would potentially cost regimes domestic and international legitimacy.
Clear regulation both of the conditions under which constitutional
replacement can occur and of the process that should be followed
during constitution-making should have at least some impact on
restraining abusive constitutionalism. It seems probable, for example,
that both the Fidesz in Hungary and Chavez in Venezuela would have
abided by more demanding constitutional rules if they had existed.
Both actors seemed wary of committing overtly illegal (as opposed to
legally ambiguous) acts.
A more substantial set of objections to constitutional replacement
clauses stems from the fact there are at least three kinds of lines that
may be difficult or impossible for such a clause to draw. First, it is
very difficult to distinguish “genuine” exercises of the popular will
from “false” or “manipulated” exercises. A replacement clause, in
preventing some “inauthentic” acts of constitution-making, would
likely also prevent some “authentic” acts. Second, as Sujit Choudry
has argued, there are situations that constitutions cannot properly be
understood to regulate, and yet it is very difficult to distinguish those
situations from ones that are properly understood as within the
existing constitutional order.216 There is a real risk that a replacement
clause might try and over-regulate, controlling situations that are
better dealt with outside the existing constitutional order. Finally, in a
more pragmatic vein, there are situations where it is better to replace
an existing constitution than maintain it. Constitutional longevity is
not an unalloyed good. Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James
Melton give an obvious example — the Lebanese Constitution of
1926, which set up a rigid power-sharing arrangement between
Muslims and Christians that broke down as demography changed, and
which was only resolved after a long civil war.217 Yet it would be
difficult for a replacement clause to distinguish situations where
replacement is unnecessary from situations where it is necessary, and
there is a risk that a replacement clause would maintain some bad
constitutions in place.

216
See Choudhry, supra note 141, at 229 (arguing that constitutional designers
must realize that there are points at which constitutionalism will inevitably fail).
Choudhry was speaking of Ackerman-style constitutional moments within a given
constitutional order, rather than replacements of constitutions.
217
See TOM GINSBURG ET AL., supra note 138, at 34-35 (noting a modest preference
in favor of constitutional stability in most circumstances, but acknowledging
situations in which constitutions should be replaced).
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All of these problems ought to give scholars humility before
recommending that replacement clauses be incorporated, even if they
do not necessarily eviscerate their value. At this point, it is sufficient
to say that the failure to deal with the problem of constitutional
replacement is a substantial gap in modern constitutional theory and
design. The practices of abusive constitutionalism show how
constitutions can be replaced opportunistically by powerful leaders in
ways that are very destructive of the democratic order. Yet while
theorists and courts have developed elaborate techniques and
doctrines to control constitutional amendment, they have left
constitutional replacement as a kind of black box.
III. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING RESPONSES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Democratic defense mechanisms are less developed in international
law than in comparative constitutional law. It has long been noted that
there is no full-fledged international law of democracy. Historically,
such matters were seen as concerning internal governance, and thus
beyond the concern of international law.218 Even after the human
rights revolution in the post–World War II period, which has reshaped
the way states treat their own citizens, the form of government has
remained largely outside the scope of international law.
Nonetheless, for several decades scholars have asserted that a
human right to democracy is emerging, and that international law is
no longer neutral on the question of the form of government.219 These
scholars cobble together a number of global and regional treaties,
declarations of the U.N. General Assembly, and other sources in
drawing this conclusion. For example, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, while not mandating a form of government,
includes relevant rights like the right to freedom of expression,
association, and voting.220 Furthermore, the Outcome Document of

218
See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992) (admitting that historically matters of internal governance
were outside the province of international law).
219
See, e.g., Fox & Nolte, supra note 109, at 6 (noting that “issues of domestic
governance [are moving] from the exclusive realm of national constitutional law and
enter[ing] the purview of international human rights law”); Franck, supra note 218
(arguing that democracy is in the process of becoming a principle of public
international law).
220
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 19, 22, 25, Mar.
23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
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the 2005 World Summit declared democracy to be a “universal
value.”221
My purpose here is not to critically examine this vast literature.222
Instead, I restrict myself to examining, in section III(A), the main
enforcement mechanism that has emerged at the regional level, the
democracy clause.223 These type of clauses generally suspend
membership in regional organizations or offer other sanctions to states
experiencing “unconstitutional interruptions” in their democratic
order or meeting other, similar conditions. These clauses may be fairly
effective at detecting military coups and other obvious breaches in the
democratic order, but they do not function well in combatting abusive
constitutionalism. The mechanisms of abusive constitutionalism are
too subtle and ambiguous to clearly trigger the clauses — for example,
it is often unclear whether or not the action is “unconstitutional,” or
whether the democratic order has been “interrupted.” Thus, the
democracy clause appears to be of limited use against what is now
emerging as the main threat to democracy.
Section III(B) considers emerging responses, in practice or in
scholarship, which would thicken the scope of review at the
international level. Most radical among these is the recent Tunisian
proposal, made before the U.N. General Assembly last year, for an
International Constitutional Court that would act as an international
arbiter of abusive actions. I do not dismiss these emerging possibilities
221

G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 135, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
For some key contributions, see, for example, Fox & Nolte, supra note 109
(arguing that such a right is emerging); Franck, supra note 218 (likewise). See also
Gregory H. Fox, Democracy, Right to, International Protection, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-36 (2012), available at http://
www.mpepil.com/subscriber_article?script=yes&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690e773&recno=1&author=Fox%20%20Gregory%20H (concluding that a right continues
to emerge but is hampered over disagreement about the definition of democracy and
because of regional differences); Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth, Introduction: The
Spread of Liberal Democracy and its Implications for International Law, in DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 2 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000)
(“[I]t is now clear that international law and international organizations are no longer
indifferent to the internal character of regimes exercising effective control within
‘sovereign’ States.”); Marks, supra note 17, at 522-24 (arguing that the idea of such an
entitlement remains unsettled and problematic in international law).
223
I do not engage the controversial question of pro-democratic intervention. See,
e.g., Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & George Downs, Intervention and Democracy, 60 INT’L
ORG. 627, 647 (2006) (finding empirical data that democratic intervention is rarely
likely to make a positive contribution); Simone van den Driest, Pro-Democratic
Intervention and the Right to Political Self-Determination: The Case of Operation Iraqi
Freedom, 57 NED. INT’L L. REV. 29, 46-48 (2010) (arguing that democratic intervention
endangers international rights to self-determination).
222
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out of hand, but I do point out the great difficulties involved in
making them effective against abusive constitutionalism.
A. Democracy Clauses
In the Americas, as in Africa, and under documents governing the
Commonwealth countries, a major mechanism of enforcement is the
so-called “democracy clause.”224 These clauses provide that under
certain circumstances, a transition from a democratic to a nondemocratic regime will be punished by international actors in the
region. The Latin American version of the clause provides that a
country may be suspended from the Organization of American States
(“OAS”) if its “democratically constituted government has been
overthrown by force.”225 Other relevant documents in the OAS system
provide for suspension in the event of an “unconstitutional
interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional alteration
of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic
order in a member state.”226 The clause contained in the Charter of the
African Union similarly states that “[g]overnments which shall come
to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to
participate in the activities of the Union,” and provides for sets of
sanctions against those regimes.227 Finally, the Commonwealth version
of the clause is triggered “particularly in the event of an
unconstitutional overthrow of a democratically elected government,”
and lays out a similar regime of sanctions.228 There is no doubt that
coups have fallen sharply in the historically coup-plagued regions
adopting these clauses, as they have worldwide.229 It is, however,
224
For a general discussion, see, for example, Theodore J. Piccone, International
Mechanisms for Protecting Democracy, in PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSES 101, 101 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna Galic eds., 2005).
225
Charter of the Organization of American States art. 9, Dec. 13, 1951, 119
U.N.T.S. 3.
226
Inter-American Democratic Charter art. 19, Sept. 11, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1289,
available at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm. Note that the
Inter-American Democratic Charter, while approved by the General Assembly of the
OAS, is not itself a treaty and thus has an uncertain status under international law.
See, e.g., Piccone, supra note 224, at 105 (noting that the Charter is not a treaty but “is
another step forward towards devising an inter-American system for preventing and
responding to breakdowns in democratic governance”).
227
Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 30, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 3.
228
Millbrook Commonwealth Action Programme on the Harare Declaration art. 3,
Nov. 1995, available at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/Internal.asp?
NodeID=35800.
229
See CENTER FOR SYSTEMATIC PEACE, POLITY IV: REGIME AUTHORITY
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difficult to tell whether the drop is caused by these clauses or by
broader changes in political and social attitudes.230
My point here is that however effective these clauses might be at
deterring or punishing coups, they are much harder to invoke against
the kinds of abusive constitutional actions surveyed in Part I. The
main reason is because these clauses generally require
“unconstitutional” action, and often further that the action
“interrupt[s]” or “overthrows” a democratic government or order. It is
often possible to gain a consensus that these conditions have been met
with respect to a classic military coup. But it is far more difficult with
respect to an incumbent government taking abusive constitutional
action to weaken the democratic order. Sometimes these actions will
appear to be clearly constitutional; in most other cases
constitutionality is at least ambiguous. Further, these types of actions
by incumbent governments may not seem to “overthrow” or
“interrupt” a democratic order, since the same incumbents tend to
continue in government.
A recent example of abusive constitutionalism highlights the point:
the invocation of the OAS democracy clause in Honduras.231 The
illuminating thing about the Honduran incident is that it involved two
clear dangers to democracy: the abusive constitutional maneuvers of
then-incumbent President Manuel Zelaya, who sought to entrench
himself in power by replacing the existing constitution and likely by
removing term limits, and the military’s removal of Zelaya from power

CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSITIONS DATASETS: COUPS D’ ETAT, 1946–2011, available at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm (finding a steady drop in the frequency
of coups since the 1960s).
230
For a study concluding that the African clause did indeed deter a number of
coups, see Jonathan Powell & Trace Lasley, Constitutional Norms and the Decline of
the Coup d’ Etat: An Empirical Assessment 19, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting
of the Southern Political Science Association (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author), available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/
5/4/4/3/0/p544304_index.html?phpsessid=995ab0d34f7dde965dabbc7730edeb67.
231
The Honduran example has been extensively discussed in recent work. See, e.g.,
Albert, Handcuffs, supra note 142, at 690-93 (arguing that the complete
unamendability of the presidential reelection provision contributed to the crisis);
Rosalind Dixon & Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions Inside Out: Outsider Interventions in
Domestic Constitutional Contests, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 149, 159 (2013) (viewing
the Honduras affair as an example of the growing phenomenon of extra-territorial
constitutional interpretation). The author served as part of a team of academics
consulting for the Honduran Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, and
evaluating the legality of the actions both of President Zelaya and of those who
removed him from power. The report was issued in 2011. See Feldman, Landau,
Sheppard & Rosa-Suazo, supra note 5, at 8.
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and from the country.232 Yet only the second action (which was viewed
by the international community as a clear “coup”) was perceived as a
danger to democracy, even though it was far from clear that it was the
more significant of the two threats.
Manuel Zelaya was elected president in 2006 as a member of one of
the country’s two major parties, but alienated both the opposition
party and elements of his own party as he pursued an increasingly
populist agenda and turned towards Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez. Zelaya
joined regional economic and foreign policy organizations created by
Chavez and criticized the existing political parties as corrupt and
illegitimate.233 The charge rang true in Honduras’ impoverished and
highly unequal economy, but it started to distance Zelaya from even
some members of his own party. Moreover, in 2008 Zelaya began to
take steps to replace the existing constitution. Following a playbook
that was similar to those already used in Venezuela, Bolivia, and
Ecuador, he argued that the existing text was discredited and obsolete,
and thus needed to be replaced with an updated text written at a new
constituent assembly.234 He was never particularly forthcoming about
what his plans for the new text were, but numerous commentators and
people around Zelaya suggested that at least one key purpose of the
Assembly would be to give Zelaya a second term in office.235
As in many cases involving abusive constitutionalism, the legality of
the steps pursued by Zelaya was unclear. The root problem is that the
Honduran Constitution, like most constitutions, has provisions for

232
I do not mean to imply that the democracy clause is the only mechanism in the
Americas that is designed to protect democracy. As has been detailed elsewhere, the
system also includes other mechanisms, especially Electoral Observation missions,
undertaken with the consent of a given country. See, e.g., Ruben M. Perina, The Role of
the Organization of American States, in PROTECTING DEMOCRACY: INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSES 127, 145 (Morton H. Halperin & Mirna Galic eds., 2005) (stating that
electoral observation missions are “one of the primary and most visible activities” of
the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy of the OAS). However, these mechanisms
also often prove problematic when dealing with competitive authoritarian regimes.
While such regimes may appear to have free and fair elections on the day of the
election itself, incumbents stack the deck between elections by controlling media,
financing, and other resources. See Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way, Why Democracy
Needs a Level Playing Field, J. DEMOCRACY, Jan. 2010, at 58-60.
233
See Feldman, Landau, Sheppard & Rosa-Suazo, supra note 5, at 10 (recounting
Zelaya’s efforts to join Petro Caribe and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of
Our America, both organizations controlled by Chavez).
234
See Buscan crear vacío de poder en Honduras, EL HERALDO (Hon.) (Jan. 17,
2009), http://archivo.elheraldo.hn/content/view/full/69737.
235
See id.
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amendment but not replacement.236 The text does not discuss the
conditions under which the existing Honduran constitutional order
may be replaced. Moreover, the Honduran Constitution contains
certain provisions that are alleged to be unamendable by any method
(the so-called “petrified” articles): one such provision limits presidents
to only one term in office.237 This added an additional layer of
complexity, because even if replacement per se would be
constitutional, it is possible that it would be found unconstitutional to
the extent that it amended the “petrified” clauses.238
At any rate, an administrative court issued a decision and several
subsequent orders requiring Zelaya to desist from carrying out the
non-binding referendum; appeals against this order to the Supreme
Court were not successful.239 Zelaya claimed that these orders were
themselves illegal, and pushed forward with his plans for a nonbinding referendum. Several days before the vote was to have been
held, his supporters broke into a military base and took ballots and
other materials needed to hold the vote.240 The OAS did not threaten
Zelaya under its democracy clause. Instead, the organization’s
Secretary General agreed — at Zelaya’s invitation — to send an

236
The relevant amendment provision provides that amendment may be
undertaken by a two-thirds vote in two consecutive ordinary sessions of the National
Congress. See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS (CONST. HOND.),
art. 373 (Hond.).
237
See CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS (CONST. HOND.), art.
374 (Hond.) (“The prior article, the present one, the articles referring to the form of
government, the national territory, the presidential term, the prohibition on again
being President of the Republic by any citizen who has exercised it under any title,
and the reference to those who cannot be President of the Republic in the following
period may not be reformed.”); see also id. art. 239 (“The citizen who has exercised
the Executive Power may not be elected President or Vice-President of the Republic.
He who breaks this disposition or proposes its reform, along with those who support
him directly or indirectly, will immediately cease in the enjoyment of their respective
charges and will remain ineligible for ten years from exercising any public function.”).
238
Further, the steps proposed by Zelaya included few guarantees of a fair process.
For example, rather than having the Supreme Electoral Tribunal supervise a
supposedly non-binding referendum on whether to go forward with the Constituent
Assembly, as was customary for all national elections, Zelaya’s decree purported to put
supervision in the hands of the military and vote counting in the hands of the agency
that conducted the census. See Feldman, Landau, Sheppard & Rosa-Suazo, supra note
5, at 32-35.
239
See id. at 25-28.
240
‘Mel’ empieza a quedarse sin respaldo, EL HERALDO (Hon.) (June 26, 2009),
http://archivo.elheraldo.hn/content/view/full/156725.
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“Accompaniment Mission” to “witness” the polls on the day of his
vote.241
Two days before the vote, on the morning of June 28, 2009, various
high-ranking members of the military entered the presidential palace
and told Zelaya that he had to come with them — he was put on a
plane and flown to Costa Rica, where he later held a press conference,
still in his pajamas.242 The military claimed to have detained Zelaya on
the authority of an arrest warrant issued by the Supreme Court,
although the warrant ordered Zelaya taken in front of the Court and
not removed from the country.243 Later that day, the Congress met,
purporting by wide majorities to “separate” Zelaya from his post and
to appoint a replacement to serve out the rest of his term, the thenPresident of Congress Roberto Michelleti.244
The international reaction to the removal of Zelaya, particularly at
the OAS, was fiercely negative. The incident was referred to as a
“coup” by virtually everyone in the region, and all actors called for
Zelaya to be reinstated in his office.245 After some short-lived
diplomatic efforts by the Secretary-General of the OAS failed, the
organization suspended Honduras under the anti-coup clause, with all
thirty-three member states voting in favor of the suspension.246 The
resolution referred to the removal of Zelaya as a “coup d’état” and
found that it constituted an “unconstitutional interruption of the

241

Note that the Secretary General referred to this mission as an “accompaniment
mission” rather than as a mission of “electoral observers.” See HUMAN RIGHTS
FOUNDATION, THE FACTS AND THE LAW BEHIND THE DEMOCRATIC CRISIS OF HONDURAS,
2009: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY LAW ANALYSIS 109-10 (2010),
http://www.thehrf.com/HRF_TheFactsAndTheLaw_Honduras2009.pdf.
242
Michelleti sucede a ‘Mel,’ LA TRIBUNA (Hon.) (June 29, 2009), available at
http://old.latribuna.hn/2009/06/29/micheletti-sucede-a-”mel”/.
243
See id.
244
This congressional action was potentially problematic, because the Constitution
contained no provision allowing for congressional removal of the president or of other
officials. Only the Supreme Court, after criminal trial, had a clear power to remove a
president. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE HONDURAS (CONST. HOND.), art.
313, cl. 2 (Hon.).
245
See UN Backs Honduras Leader’s Return, BBC NEWS (June 30, 2009),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8127503.stm (collecting condemnations issued by
government agencies, by the OAS, and by the United Nations General Assembly); see
also INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HONDURAS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THE COUP D’ ETAT 1 (2009) (concluding that the events in Honduras constituted a
“coup”), available at http://www.cidh.org/pdf%20files/HONDURAS2009ENG.pdf.
246
See Ginger Thompson & Marc Lacey, O.A.S. Votes to Suspend Honduras Over
Coup, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/world/americas/
05honduras.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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democratic order” under the democracy clause.247 Many major
countries sanctioned Honduras, including aid cutoffs from both the
United States and the European Union.248 The suspension was not
lifted until two years later, after Honduras had had an intervening
election.249
The Honduras incident is illustrative for showing the weaknesses of
democracy clauses as applied to abusive constitutionalism. The
military’s removal of Zelaya triggered a strong response under the
democracy clause because it replaced a democratic government in
flagrant violation of constitutional norms.250 It brought back memories
of the military governments of the 1970s and 1980s, and thus
provoked a strong reaction from the region. In contrast, the actions of
Zelaya were difficult to shoe-horn under the clause. The
constitutionality of many of his actions appeared to rest on delicate
constitutional judgments, and there was no single point where the
constitutional order appeared to have been “interrupted” or
“suspended.”
Nonetheless, the threat posed by Zelaya to the democratic order was
fairly serious. While the military did remove Zelaya from power in
obvious violation of constitutional norms, it showed no interest in
governing, instead turning over power to the President of Congress.
Zelaya, in contrast, seemed poised to take unilateral action to replace
the existing constitution, against the wishes of the other branches of
government. While his concrete plans for the new constitutional order
were unclear, there were obvious examples from other recent
constitution-making experiences in neighboring countries —
247
See ORG. AM. STATES, Press Release, Organization of American States, OAS
Suspends Membership of Honduras (July 5, 2009), http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/
press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-219/09.
248
See PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RES. SERV., HONDURAN-U.S. RELATIONS 16 (2013),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34027.pdf.
249
See OAS Lifts Honduras Suspension After Zelaya Agreement, BBC NEWS (June 1,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13622939.
250
Few actors seriously contended, for example, that the military’s removal of
Zelaya was constitutional. However, the legality of certain actions surrounding the
removal has been more controversial. Actors have taken both sides of the question on
the issue of whether congress had the power to “separate” Zelaya from office. Compare
Feldman, Landau, Sheppard & Rosa-Suazo, supra note 5, at 57-61 (concluding that
the attempt was unconstitutional), and HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION, supra note 241
(same), with Dixon & Jackson, supra note 231, at 174-80 (noting the disagreement in
evaluations of the congressional action), and Frank M. Walsh, The Honduran
Constitution is not a Suicide Pact: The Legality of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya’s
Removal, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339 (2010) (concluding that removal power could
be implied under the circumstances).

2013]

Abusive Constitutionalism

255

Venezuela and Ecuador — that the replacement process could be used
to greatly entrench the power of an incumbent president and to
disable competing institutions. The differential response of
international regional institutions to Zelaya and to the regime that
replaced him did not make sense from the standpoint of democracy
promotion.251
B. Emerging and Proposed Responses at the International Level:
Towards a Global Constitutional Court?
Can the democracy clause be improved or rewritten to deal more
effectively with abusive constitutional practices, or is a more effective
alternative regime possible? These questions are important because
they will determine how much of a role international law can have in
preventing the emergence of competitive authoritarian regimes in the
future. A full answer to this question is, most likely, an article unto
itself. But I can offer some tentative suggestions about the route that
such improvement might take.
One possibility would be to enforce the existing clauses more
rigorously, so that they catch not only blatant constitutional ruptures
like military coups, but also more ambiguous constitutional violations
by incumbent governments, such as those undertaken in Venezuela,
Ecuador, and Honduras.252 This path should probably be rejected.
Many acts of abusive constitutionalism — for example, those in
Hungary — seem unambiguously to follow prevailing constitutional
norms. And for those that are ambiguous, a declaration by
international actors that the action was in fact “unconstitutional”
would require difficult and controversial constitutional judgments by
“outsiders” to the constitutional order.
As Vicki Jackson and Rosalind Dixon have recently argued, this
kind of “extra-territorial constitutional interpretation” seems
problematic, especially when taken in controversial cases and when
used coercively.253 A good example is offered by recent events in
251
This is not to say that the OAS was unwarranted in sanctioning the removal.
There are still likely good reasons to sanction military interventions in politics.
Moreover, the action destabilized the country and led to some human rights abuses.
See, e.g., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 245 (detailing the
use of states of exception and collecting evidence of human rights abuses).
252
See Piccone, supra note 224, at 122-23 (arguing that the clauses could be
utilized to cover cases of “democratic erosion” as well as sharp ruptures of the
democratic order such as coups).
253
See Dixon & Jackson, supra note 231, at 154-56 (developing the concept of
“extra-territorial” constitutional interpretation).
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Paraguay, where many Latin American countries suggested again
invoking the OAS democracy clause after an incumbent president was
impeached.254 The impeachment received the requisite number of
congressional votes, but occurred extremely quickly, leading many in
the international community to label it a “parliamentary coup” that
lacked the requisite “due process.”255 But since the Paraguayan
Constitution fails to spell out what kind of due process is required for
impeachment, or even whether any due process is required, such a
judgment would require delicate constitutional judgments by
international institutions with no particular knowledge of Paraguayan
constitutional law. It seems doubtful that those judgments are either
feasible or desirable, and such interventions would likely be taken for
political purposes rather than with the effect of improving
democracy.256
A second possibility would be to provide for specific constitutional
“recipes” across countries — requiring, for example, that constitutions
include certain elements such as ombudsmen, constitutional courts,
etc. This “thickened” conception of democracy also seems unlikely to
work in practice. It would require a consensus on constitutional
design that does not appear to exist in most parts of the world.257 More
fundamentally, abusive constitutionalist practices can work by
constructing constitutions that seem democratic in their individual
parts, but are authoritarian in their overall interaction or in the ways
in which institutions function in practice. Checking institutions like
courts or ombudsmen exist in all of these regimes; they are simply
packed or otherwise rendered ineffective. Kim Lane Scheppele has
recently labeled the new Hungarian state a “Frankenstate” —
democratic-seeming in its individual details, but with a monstrous
overall effect.258 A constitutional order could easily be devised that
254
See Paraguay: President Impeached, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012), http://www.
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255
See Lugo Denounces Removal from Paraguay Presidency as Coup, BBC NEWS (June
24, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-18569378.
256
See Stephen Schnably, Emerging International Law Constraints on Constitutional
Structure and Revision: A Preliminary Appraisal, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 417, 479-80
(2008) (noting that internal legal struggles can be “lethal” for democracy, but
expressing doubt that international intervention can work in a productive fashion).
257
See Schnably, Constitutionalism, supra note 18, at 198 (arguing that
“[c]onstitutional design is too fluid, too tied to each country’s own history, culture,
politics, and economics” to make a thicker consensus on democracy within the
Americas possible).
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See Kim Lane Scheppele, Not Your Father’s Authoritarianism: The Creation of the
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Section), Winter 2013, at 5.
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would meet any checklist of individual institutional elements while
being authoritarian in practice.
A third, and potentially more effective, possibility may be
developing out of the current Hungarian mess. The European Union,
as noted in Part I, has had a slow and partially ineffective response in
Hungary. Actors must go through rigorous reviews of their
institutional order to be admitted to the Union, but once admitted
they are no longer subject to these sorts of “thick” reviews.259 As a
result, the Union has had to rig together a set of responses from tools,
like infringement actions in front of the European Court of Justice,
which were created for other ends. But Europeans are now considering
creating an institution that would carry out “thick” periodic reviews of
the constitutional order of all European states to ensure that they
actually are functioning as liberal democracies.260 Non-compliant
states would be subject to adverse action by the Union. Theoretically,
such an approach should prove superior to the other two at detecting
abusive constitutionalism, because it allows space for exactly the kinds
of complex analysis needed to identify and analyze it. Still, it is unclear
whether a consensus exists to create such an institution within the
European Union; the prospects in other regions are much grimmer in
the short term.
The boldest of all the proposals is the recent call for an International
Constitutional Court.261 In the midst of the complex democratic
advances and retrogressions of the Arab Spring, interim Tunisian
President Moncef Marzouki argued that such a Court would be useful
precisely as a protection against abusive constitutionalism. As he
stated in his speech before the U.N. General Assembly, “dictatorships
g[i]ve themselves a ‘false legality’ by organizing fraudulent elections
and using democratic principles to undermine democracy itself.”262
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The Court would be empowered to combat these abuses by, for
example, “denounce[ing] certain constitutions or illegal charters or
illegal or fraudulent elections.”263
This proposal is provocative and potentially important in starting a
productive dialogue at the international level. The analysis carried out
in this Article suggests important questions. What body of law would
such a court apply? On the one hand, there appears to be no
developed body of international law on the topic, and the emergence
of a thick enough consensus on the content of democratic institutions
is still a long way off, even within most regions. On the other hand, if
the court would be charged primarily with applying the domestic law
of the state at issue, then it would raise the same problems faced by
democracy clauses. Acts of abusive constitutionalism do not flagrantly
violate the constitutional text, and international bodies have suspect
legitimacy to undertake final interpretations of ambiguous points from
a domestic constitutional order.264 So it is likely that such a court
would only be able to weed out flagrant violations of the constitutional
order — badly rigged elections, for example — and not to deal with
the subtler exercises of abusive constitutionalism surveyed in this
Article.
Further, a commission or similar body may be the appropriate
institutional form, rather than a court. The pressing task is not to
determine whether a particular action was legal or illegal within the
domestic constitutional order, or even whether a particular kind of
institution — such as a constitutional court or impartial electoral
commission — is present or missing from that order. It is instead to
determine whether the order as a whole complies with certain basic
principles that make it adequately democratic, and whether a given
episode of political or constitutional change has made the regime
markedly less democratic than it was previously. This is a task that
might conceivably be undertaken by a global equivalent of the Venice
Commission wielding a set of soft norms, but it is difficult to see how
it could be carried out by an International Constitutional Court.265
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CONCLUSION: AN IMPOSSIBLE AGENDA FOR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY?
My main purpose in this Article has been conceptual and
descriptive. I have argued that the undermining of democracy through
the use of the tools of constitutional change is likely to be increasingly
common in the future, and that we have few adequate responses in
comparative and international law.
The next question is obvious: can we develop more effective
responses at either the domestic or international level? An honest
answer must express some recognition of the difficulty of the task. As
the examples here have shown, abusive constitutional practices can
proceed through a variety of different routes to achieve the same goals
— constitutional replacement can be used if constitutional
amendment attempts are stymied, and would-be authoritarians can
resort to undermining a number of different institutions, in a number
of different ways, to achieve their goals. The Hungarian example is
perhaps the best example of this fungibility problem: the Fidesz
amended and then replaced the Constitution, and it has used a
number of different techniques, both constitutional and legal, to
undermine the power of checking institutions and to entrench the
party’s power.266 For example, the Fidesz has undermined the
judiciary by changing the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, by
expanding the size of the court and then packing it, by altering the
retirement age for ordinary judges, and by controlling the institution
with power over ordinary judicial appointments.267 Finding effective
responses to this kind of structural undermining is a complex
undertaking.
Still, the importance of the practice of abusive constitutionalism
may help to reorient some of the key questions in the field. For
example, recent scholarship has focused largely on multiethnic
polities, which are seen as more likely to face a variety of ills,
including violence and democratic overthrow.268 But the problem of
abusive constitutionalism seems more likely to crop up in relatively
homogenous polities, where vote counts tend to be more unstable and
political parties often less rooted.269 The problem of abusive
266
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constitutionalism thus suggests a broad agenda on the design of
institutions and elections for scholars working on relatively
homogenous states.
Further, the problem of abusive constitutionalism reinforces a key
point: the formal rules embodied in constitutions are often stunningly
weak, and even perceivably strong rules can be captured in a
surprisingly high number of circumstances. The trick, of course, is
preserving constitutionalism in the face of this reality. In part, the
answers lie in constructing a more intricate formal system of
constitutional change: this is what amendment tiers or replacement
clauses do. But perhaps more significantly, the answer lies in
developing a different conception of constitutionalism altogether. The
doctrine of unconstitutional-constitutional amendments, and perhaps
the emerging European responses to Hungary, suggest a more
substantive conception of constitutionalism — one that states that a
constitution is not really constitutional unless it actually works in
certain ways and adheres to certain fundamental principles. The
emerging shape of these doctrines, and the distribution of authority
between domestic and international interpreters, will be a major focus
of the “global dialogue” of constitutional judges and scholars in
coming years.

note 172, at 196 (noting that political results in multiethnic societies can resemble a
“census”).

